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Equal Citizenship, Self-Determination, and the U.S.
Statehood Process: A Constitutional and Historical
Analysis*
by Luis R. Ddvila-Col6nt
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATION
T HROUGHOUT THE LAST two centuries, five provisions have been
incorporated into the United States Constitution which are funda-
mental to the process of admitting new States into the American
federation.
As a summary, the first of these provisions empowers Congress to
admit new members into the Union;1 the second permits it to regulate,
administer and dispose of the national territory;2 the third compels that
body to insure a republican form of government for the citizens of each
state in the Nation;s and the fourth is a broad delineation of American
Federalism and the limits of federal authority vis-a-vis the State's indi-
vidual sovereignty;" and the fifth provides the basis for a right to state-
hood founded on the principles of equal citizenship and equal protection
under the laws.8 It is within this constitutional framework that an at-
tempt will be made to review the legal parameters of the American state-
hood process and the historical guidelines traditionally followed by Con-
gress when admitting a territory into the Union.
II. THE POWER TO ADMIT NEW STATES INTO THE UNION
The earliest provision pertaining to the admission of new States into
the Union dates back to 1777 with the enactment of Article XI of the
* An abridged version of G.T.P., Inc., Breakthrough from Colonialism: An Inter-
disciplinary History of American Statehood (to be published by the Univ. of Puerto Rico
Press in 1982).
t Law Offices of Gerardo A. Carlo, Old San Juan, Puerto Rico. B.A., Marquette Univer-
sity (1974); J.D., University of Puerto Rico (1977). Member of the Inter-American Bar
Association.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
3 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Articles of Confederation.6 This article provided for the admission of
other colonies if nine States supported the proposal.' However, the even-
tual establishment of new States (other than the British colonies) within
the limits of the Confederation seems to have been overlooked by the
framers of that instrument.8 The Articles do not contain a clause author-
izing the Continental Congress or any other body to admit new States or
to govern territories. As a matter of fact, these omissions were regarded as
serious defects by Madison, who felt that the Northwest Ordinances were
illegal enactments by a Congress whose acts had extended far beyond its
constitutional authority.
Certainly, the decade of the 1780's evidenced the urgent need for an
express constitutional mandate that would have vested Congress with am-
ple authority to administer the new western territory and to accept new
members into the sisterhood of States. The congressional Resolution of
1780,10 which reflected a compromise between the small landless states
and those having claims over large portions of western territories, virtu-
ally assured the inclusion of territorial and admission clauses as future
amendments to the Articles, or subsequent Constitution:
Some of the States most interested in the vacant and unpatented west-
ern territory at length yielded to the earnest solicitations of Congress on
this subject. To induce them to make liberal cessions, Congress declared
that the ceded territory should be disposed of for the common benefit of
the Union, and formed into republican States, with the same rights of
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the other States; to be of a
suitable extent of territory, not less than one hundred, nor more than
one hundred and fifty miles square ... 11
Although no express authority can be found, the power to admit new
States into the Confederation was consistently reaffirmed by the Conti-
nental Congress through the passage of the Northwest Ordinances in
1784, 1785 and 1787.' s These enactments have provided for the admission
of those States which were carved out of the ceded northwest lands on
"an equal footing with the original States."' 8 For this reason the framers
of the Constitution in 1787 immediately proceeded to legitimize this
* Articles of Confederation, art. XI, reprinted in 1 Stat. 8 (1845).
7 Id.
8 THE FEDERALiST Nos. 38, 42, 43 (J. Madison).
9 Id.
10 See Resolve of Oct. 10, 1780, 3 JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 535 (Washing-
ton, 1823).
1 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 195-96
(1891).
" See 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 121, 123, 128. (H. Commager ed. 1966) re-
printing the Ordinances.
Is Northwest Ordinance of 1787, reprinted in 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (1789).
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extra-legal state of affairs by unequivocally affirming that "New States
may be admitted by the Congress into this Union'.. ,,.14
Undoubtedly, Congress has the primary power to admit territories
into the Union. The language of the State's admission clause is clear as to
the breadth of discretion granted to Congress to accept new members into
the Federation. The discretion to admit also encompasses the Congres-
sional prerogative to delay admission for as long as deemed necessary, as
well as the corollary power to reject or deny admission based on estab-
lished constitutional limitations. Thus, the Federal Constitution vests in
Congress the essential and discretionary authority to admit new states
into the Union by whatever means it considers appropriate as long as
such means are framed within its vested powers. Throughout the last two
centuries Congress has positively exercised this power with 37 political
entities beginning in 1791 with the admission of Vermont 5 and up until
recently with the admission of Hawaii in 1959.6 Conversely, Congress has
also used its power in delaying, for various reasons, the admission of most
States into the Union. However, we should point out that neither house
of Congress has ever voted to reject or deny admission to the Union by
any State which had petitioned it. If Congress had issued blanket denial,
it would have been invalid because no Congress can bind a succeeding or
future Congress. In 1850, congressional action approached such a denial
when New Mexico's Tennessee Plan petition for admission was side-
tracked with the passage of an unwarranted organic act.1" This procedural
maneuver may be viewed as a factor contributing to the ensuing 62 years
of colonialism which undermined the efforts of the people in that region.'
Despite the perceived tone of rejection in this one instance, Congress has
never actually denied admission to the Union to any entity that has re-
quested entrance.'
The early drafts of the clause pertaining to admission, which were
submitted to the Constitutional Convention, varied in some respects from
the present clause. This disparity is especially noticeable in the section
14 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
1 Act of Feb. 18, 1791, ch. VII, 1 Stat. 191.
'6 Act of Mar. 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4.
,7 Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. XLIX, 9 Stat. 446.
'8 New Mexico's petiton ran on the coattails of California's swift and unprecedented
admission, but still it reached Congress right after the Compromise Measures of 1850 had
been signed. New Mexico, which had drawn a "State" constitution forbidding slavery, fell
victim to the rancor coming from the slave States, which bitterly and successfully opposed
its admission. See G. LEHLEITNER, THE TENNESSEE PLAN: How THE BOLD BECAME STATES,
11-12 (1956).
19 However, it should be noted that the petitions of some territories (e.g., Hawaii) were
repeatedly tabled or ignored by one or both Houses of Congress (by the Senate in the case
of Hawaii in 1947, 1950, and 1953) before finally attaining assent.
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which initially required the consent of two-thirds of the members present
in each House for the admission of any new State. As we have seen, this
two-thirds voting requirement was discarded by the delegates to the con-
vention in favor of the present text which grants Congress almost unlim-
ited discretion as to the terms upon which it may admit States.2 0 Thus,
since 1789, formal admission has required only the passage of enabling or
admission legislation by a simple majority of the members present and
voting in both Houses of Congress as well as the approval of the Execu-
tive, as is required by any other congressional enactment.2 1
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
Although the power to admit new states into the Union has been ex-
pressly delegated to Congress, it is also true that the concomitant power
to erect and create new states has been expressly reserved to the people
by the language of the Tenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Hence, the creation of a State depends exclusively upon the will of the
people. Congress does not have the power to compel the people of a given
territory to come into the Union as a State, for to do so would be to
violate the most basic constitutional principles of liberty and self-deter-
mination, along with the very nature of American republicanism. The
Constitution very explicitly indicates that only Congress has the power to
admit States. However, the power to create them resides exclusively in
the people of the given territory: "It is by their sovereign will, alone, that
the State comes into existence."" Therefore, it follows that the creation
of a State has always preceded its admission into the federation because
no geopolitical unit less than an organized State can enter the Union.
The constitutional nature of the principle of popular sovereignty as
an expression of self-determination was precisely reaffirmed by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in the case of Texas v. White,"8 which
defined the word "state" in a political and constitutional context:
... A State, in the ordinary sense of the Constitution, is a political com-
munity of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and
organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written con-
stitution, and established by the consent of the governed. It is the union
SO See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 446-47, 454-56 (M.
Farrand ed. 1911).
"' Andrew Johnson, in the cases of Nebraska and Colorado, and William H. Taft, in the
cases of Arizona and New Mexico, were the only two Presidents who vetoed acts providing
for the admission of a given territory into the Union. Executive approval came swiftly for all
other states. Thus, the only denials of admission in history resulted from Presidential ve-
toes, not Congressional refusal.
22 E. Joy, THE RIGHT OF THE TERRITORIES TO BECOME STATES OF THE UNION 7-8 (1892).
23 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
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of such states, under a common constitution, which forms the distinct
and greater political unit, which that Constitution designates as the
United States, and makes of the people and states which compose it one
people and one country.2"
The historical operation of this fundamental principle of popular
sovereignty dates back to the birth of the first 13 States. The develop-
ment of these states established the standard of creating fully operational
and constitutional governments which displaced the existing British colo-
nial structures, prior to 1776. The people in the territories of Missouri,
Michigan, Oregon, Kansas, Minnesota and Nebraska had also created "de
facto" state governments which operated parallel to the territorial organi-
zation. Similarly, the people in Vermont and West Virginia proceeded to
erect fully operational "extra-legal state governments" as a challenge to
the formal authorities of their mother States of New York and Virginia,
respectively. Furthermore, the people of Texas also established a fully op-
erational national government which enabled them to declare their inde-
pendence from Mexico in 1836 and to survive as a sovereign republic un-
til 1845, when they were formally granted statehood.'5 Thus, a total of 22
States were actually operational political units before their formal admis-
sion into the Union.
Conversely, in the case of the other 28 States, the State governmental
structures were not fully operational until the moment they entered the
Union. At that time, the new state government superseded the old struc-
ture of government; there were 25 States with territorial governments.
Two other States, Kentucky and Maine, emerged from the control of
their mother states of Virginia and Massachusetts, respectively, and a
third, California, was created from a militarily controlled area.
Generally, the creation of each State was accomplished by the people
themselves after the election of delegates to a popular convention en-
trusted with the task of drafting a constitution as the basic framework for
the future State. As previously indicated, these constitutional conventions
were usually called in either of two ways: (1) by direct popular initiative
- the states which used the Tennessee Plan are the most successful ex-
amples of this method, or (2) by the passage of a congressional enabling
act providing the mechanism for holding a congressional convention in
response to a popular petition for admission. The latter was simply sup-
plementary to the course pursued by the various people who demanded
the termination of colonial bondage in their own territories. Again, it
24 Id. at 721. Before 1868, the Supreme Court of the United States had suggested by
way of dicta that a "state" can exist within the limits of the Constitution prior to its formal
admission. See Scott v. Jones, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 343 (1847) (action not cognizable under the
Judiciary Act).
15 Joint Resolution of Dec. 29, 1845, Res. 1, 9 Stat. 108.
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should be stressed that in all 50 cases the very existence and sovereignty
of the State emanated from the will of the people rather than from the
whim of a particular Congress.2
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER TO ADMIT STATES
A. States Carved-Out from Other States
The States' admission clause gives Congress ample discretion to ad-
mit a new State into the Union. Nevertheless, the language of this provi-
sion imposes upon Congress two basic constraints. First, no State can be
formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State without the
consent of the legislature of the "mother" State. 7 Second, no State can
be formed by the junction of of two or more States, or parts of States
without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned.2 8 Admis-
sion in these specific cases also requires the consent of a majority of mem-
bers in both Houses of Congress and the approval of the Executive, as is
necessary in any other congressional enactment. In practice, these limita-
tions were relevant to the the admissions process used for Vermont, Ken-
tucky, Maine and West Virginia, four States carved out of the territories
of previously admitted States.
Vermont acquired its separation from New York, her mother State,
in 1790, when both entities reached a compromise on the delineation of
their boundaries and the settlement of private claims to the title of lands
lying within the boundaries of the Green Mountain Region.2 New York's
consent to the division of its territory was expedited by a group of com-
missioners who had been given plenary power to represent that State in
the negotiations for separation. Once New York voters assented, the ad-
mission of Vermont as the 14th State of the Union came swiftly in 1791;
four years earlier, in Philadelphia the framers of the Federal Constitution
had already envisioned Vermont's admission to statehood.3 0
One year later, Kentucky, a county of Virginia, was admitted as the
15th State of the Union. 1 Separation from its mother State ensued after
Virginia's House of Burgesses passed three acts of separation. These acts
provided for the holding of several regional constitutional conventions
" See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868). See also The Formation and Ad-
mission of New States into the Union (C. Swackhamer ed.) 40 U.S. DEMOCRATIC REV. 413
(1857); 2D. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY, APPLICATION
AND CONSTRUCTION 1250-51 (1910).
27 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
28 Id.
2 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 446-47, 454-56.
o 1 Farrand, supra note 20, at 188-89; 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 94, 445-46, 462-63;
3 Farrand, supra note 20, at 226.
1 Act of Feb. 4, 1791, ch. IV, 1 Stat. 189.
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along with a set of deadlines imposed on Congress for the admission of
the new State into the Union. Kentucky's statehood was not unexpected
because, in 1787, the framers of the Federal Constitution also considered
the admission of this area to the Union highly likely. 8
In 1819, the Massachusetts legislature passed an act allowing for the
separation of its District of Maine as an independent State, provided that
a majority of the District's population assented by referendum to the pro-
posal. 8 One year later, Maine became the 23rd State of the Union and
the third State carved out from the territory of another State.8 '
By contrast to the seemingly routine admission of these three States,
the admission of West Virginia in 1863 represents what many regard as
the most controversial interpretation of the Federal Constitution in the
200 year process of'American statehood. 8 The separation of West Vir-
ginia from Virginia occurred during the Civil War, a confrontation which
jeopardized the nature of American Federalism and the very existence of
the Union. The constitutional crisis over slavery had reached a crucial
point by mid-1861 when all 11 States of the Confederacy, including the
State of Virginia, had seceded from the Union." This series of events
posed a serious obstacle to the aspirations of the people living in the
western counties of Virginia who wished to become citizens of an inde-
pendent State. At that time it became apparent that the Virginia Legisla-
ture would not assent to the separation of the western parts of its own
territory which, remained loyal to the Northern cause.
The proponents of statehood in western Virginia were aware of the
constitutional provision that required the consent of the legislature of the
mother State before any part of its domain could become a separate
State. Therefore, statehood leaders in western Virginia declared the se-
cession of Virginia "void" and proceeded to reorganize the "government"
of Virginia for the exclusive purpose of expediting the indispensable au-
thorization for separation. This bold and unprecedented act was severely
criticized by even the most objective observers for functioning as merely
subterfuge which would enable the western counties to break away from
the parent State. Opponents of statehood for West Virginia also argued
that the true goal of the reorganization was the rehabilitation of the rebel
State, rather than the dismemberment or division of it. In spite of these
32 1 Farrand, supra note 20, at 188-89; 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 94, 462-63; 3
Farrand, supra note 20, at 226, 559.
'3 Act of June 19, 1819, ch. CLXI, 1819 Mass. Acts 248.
Act of Mar. 3, 1820, ch. XIX, 3 Stat. 544.
35 Wiston, Statehood for West Virginia an Illegal Act?, 30 W. VA. HIST. 530, 531
(1969).
26 Virginia formally seceded from the Union on April 17, 1861. The other Southern
States which formed the Confederacy were South Carolina, North Carolina, Mississippi,
Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Texas, Arkansas and Tennessee.
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objections, Congress proceeded to legitimize the acts of the "reorganized
government" of Virginia by admitting West Virginia, in 1863, as the 35th
State of the Union.87
Today, 117 years later, the constitutionality of West Virginia's ad-
mission into the Union is still a controversial and much debated issue
among historians and legal scholars.88 Certainly, the Civil War and the
imminent threat to the Federal Union were compelling factors in resolv-
ing that statehood drama. Still, one could objectively interpret the record
to show that the admission of West Virginia was, at best, a congressional
act that stretched the language of the Constitution to unprecedented
limits. The circumstances surrounding West Virginia's statehood also
demonstrate the congressional flexibility used to respond to the political,
economic and social realities of the nation. At the very least, these events
indicate that the exclusive power of Congress to admit new States into
the Union is subject only to the limits imposed by the Federal Constitu-
tion, and that political considerations rather than legal niceties have
often determined the process of admission.
B. Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government
In part, Article IV, section 4 of the Federal Constitution states, "The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government. . .. ,,' The Founding Fathers apparently intended
to impose upon the Federal Government the duty of guaranteeing a re-
publican form of government to each new member of the Union. The ba-
sis for this type of government stems from the principle of "the consent
of the governed," wherein the ultimate sovereignty resides in the people
of each State.'0 Although there are many variations, the essence of this
ideal form of government lies in the "republican election" and the princi-
ple of "fair representation".41 As a result, this form excludes any kind of
monarchical, authoritarian or despotic government.'
By judicial interpretation, dating back to 1849 in the case of Luther
v. Borden,"' Congress has the primary responsibility for overseeing the
establishment of the republican form of government in each new State
admitted to the Union. In Luther, Chief Justice Taney held that Con-
gress must decide which government is the established one in a State and
31 Act of Dec. 31, 1862, ch. VI, 12 Stat. 633.
38 See, e.g., Wiston, supra note 35.
39 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
40 Address by George W. Wickersham, New States and Constitutions, Yale University
Law School (June 19, 1911).
41 See In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891).
41 See 1 Farrand, supra note 20, at 206.
's 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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whether that government is republican. Such congressional decision was
held to be binding on every other department of the government, and not
questionable in a judicial proceeding."'
Twenty years later, in the landmark case of Texas v. White," the
Supreme Court held that Congress also had the duty to restore the re-
publican form of governments to those States which seceded from the
Union during the Civil War.46 Furthermore, in that case the Court held
that the action taken by the President to set up provisional governments
at the end of the war was justified only as an exercise of his powers as
Commander-in-Chief; such governments, however, were to be regarded
merely as provisional structures whose life and powers were subject to
pending action by Congress.' 7 Consequently, when a new political entity
is being considered for admission to the Union, Congress has the duty to
examine the proposed State constitution to guarantee the Federal consti-
tutional requirement of republicanism.
Congressional concern about the implementation of this specific form
of government in the creation of States was often reflected in the passage
of individual enabling acts for territories with aspirations of statehood.
The practice of preparing detailed enabling acts started with Ohio's state-
hood process in 180248 and continued with the admission of 20 additional
States.4
9
An enabling act has traditionally been optional legislation drawn up
by Congress. Such an act contains individual provisions which have been
derived from its constitutional power to admit territories into statehood,
its immense power over the territories, and its power to guarantee a re-
publican government as it applies to the specific provisions dealing with
the future State's constitutional conventions. In general, a typical ena-
bling act both summoned and provided the mechanisms for the assembly
of delegates to draft a constitution and to frame a State government."
Usually, the act prescribed the qualifications for delegates, voting require-
" Id. at 42.
46 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
" Id. at 727-29.
47 Id. at 730.
41 Act of April 30, 1802, ch. XL, 2 Stat. 173.
49 Louisiana (1812), Indiana (1816), Mississippi (1817), Illinois (1818), Alabama (1819),
Missouri (1821), Wisconsin (1848), Minnesota (1858), Kansas (1861), Nevada (1864), Ne-
braska (1867), Colorado (1876), South Dakota (1889), North Dakota (1889), Montana
(1889), Washington (1889), Utah (1896), Oklahoma (1907), New Mexico (1912) and Arizona
(1912). It is interesting to point out that in the case of Alabama, the enabling act was
drafted and prepared by the territorial legislature and submitted to Congress for its ap-
proval and enactment. On the other hand, Texas, an independent constitutional republic
prior to admission, was instructed by Congress through a Joint Resolution of Annexation to
prepare its own state constitution. Joint Resolution of Mar. 1, 1845, Res. 8, 5 Stat. 797.
5* See, e.g., Act of April 30, 1802, ch. XL, 2 Stat. 173.
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ments, the time, place and procedural details for the convention, the pop-
ular ratification process and the way in which the results of the referen-
dum were to be transmitted to the Federal Government for its approval."
These specific guidelines were intended to supplement and expedite the
decolonization process applicable to each issue while at the same time
easing the transition from territory to State. The creation of the State
and the specific content of each State constitution was left to the inhabi-
tants of the state because the power to create a State is one exclusively
reserved to its people by the principle of popular sovereignty or self-
determination.
It should be noted that 15 States assumed the initiative and followed
the path established by the original 13 colonies by assembling their own
constitutional conventions without the benefit of congressional guidelines.
Six of these areas, Tennessee, Michigan, Iowa, California, Oregon, and
Alaska, drafted their own constitutions and elected complete congres-
sional delegations before their formal admission to the Union. Five other
territories, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Wyoming and Hawaii, drafted State
constitutions without previous congressional authorization. Four addi-
tional areas were carved out from previously existing States: Vermont
(1791), Kentucky (1792), Maine (1820), and West Virginia (1863) and
were admitted as separate States by simple acts of admission. In short, a
total of 28 States drafted their own constitutions without previous con-
gressional intervention or authorization."
Regardless of the procedure used to call a constitutional convention,
once assembled, the delegates proceeded to organize the future State gov-
ernment by drafting a written constitution as their fundamental law. Af-
ter completing this work, the constitutional document was usually sub-
mitted to the territorial inhabitants for ratification or rejection in
accordance with the requirements of the acts and proclamations calling
the convention, or by direction of the convention itself. Historical records
show that in at least 26 territories the constitutions were submitted to the
people for ratification or rejection."
As a general rule, Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional duty
to ensure a "republican form of government" in each State, included in
most enabling acts (as well as in some admission acts) certain require-
51 Id.
52 See also W. TANSILL, ADMISSION OF THE STATES INTO THE UNION: A BRIEF SUMMARY OF
PROCEDURES 4-6 (rev. ed. 1970).
5 This was the case in Maine (1819), Michigan (1835), Florida (1839), Texas (1845),
Iowa (1846), Wisconsin (1848), California (1849), Minnesota (1857), Oregon (1857), Kansas
(1859), West Virginia (1863), Nevada (1864), Nebraska (1866), Colorado (1876), North
Dakota (1889), South Dakota (1889), Montana (1889), Washington (1889), Idaho (1889),
Wyoming (1889), Utah (1895), Oklahoma (1907), Arizona (1911), New Mexico (1911),
Hawaii (1950), and Alaska (1956).
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ments relative to the specific nature of each new State government." The
most frequently recurring provisions appear to be the following: (1) an
express clause stipulating that a republican form of government be estab-
lished;" (2) a standard provision stating that the new state constitution
must be consistent with the Federal constitution;" (3) a provision stating
that the new constitution could not supercede the Ordinance of 1787; 5
(4) specific clauses guaranteeing the fundamental principles of civil and
religious liberty;" (5) provisions requiring the new State constitution to
be submitted to the people for ratification or rejection;" (6) a clause spec-
ifying that the constitution could make no distinction in civil or political
rights based on race or color;1° (7) another provision which stated that
future State legislation could not restrict the right of suffrage on account
of race, color or previous condition of servitude;61 (8) similar sections pro-
scribing slavery in a future State;"2 and (9) a standard clause presented in
the enabling and admission enactments for most States, beginning with
the admission of Nevada in 1864,6" specifying that the future State con-
stitutions could not violate the principles of the Declaration of
Independence."'
Following ratification, the State constitutions and supporting docu-
ments were forwarded to Congress or to the Executive depending upon
whether or not the enabling or admission act delegated to the President
" See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXPERIENCES OF PAST TERRITORIES CAN
ASSIST PUERTO Rico STATUS DELIBERATIONS (1980) [hereinafter cited as EXPERIENCES OF
PAST TERRITORIES].
11 After the admission of Ohio, all enabling and admission enactments included this
type of clause. Id. at Table of Major Conditions Contained in Statehood Enabling and
Admission Acts.
0' Such a provision can be found in the admission and enabling legislation of Louisiana,
Wisconsin, Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Washington, Idaho, Wyoming,
Oklahoma, Arizona, New Mexico, Hawaii, and Alaska. Id.
11 As found in the enabling acts of Ohio, Mississippi, Indiana, Illinois, Alabama and
Missouri. Id.
" This type of clause can be found in the enabling acts of Louisiana, Nevada, Ne-
braska, Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, Montana, Utah, Oklahoma,
Arizona and New Mexico. Id.
" Included in the enabling acts of Louisiana, Wisconsin, California, Minnesota, Oregon,
Kansas, West Virginia, Colorado, Nevada, Nebraska, The Dakotas, Montana, Washington,
Utah, Oklahoma, New Mexico and Arizona. Id.
60 As found in the enabling acts of Colorado, The Dakotas, Montana, Washington,
Utah, Oklahoma, New Mexico and Arizonas. Id.
61 As found in the enabling acts of Oklahoma, New Mexico and Arizona. Id.
62 Specifically included in the case of West Virginia and Nebraska. Id.
13 Act of Mar. 21, 1864, ch. XXXVI, 13 Stat. 30.
6 This specific requirement has its origins in the Civil War and the desire to abolish
slavery from all American institutions. The requirement emphasizes the principle of equal-
ity of men before the law as expressed in the Declaration of Independence. See Park, Ad-
mission of States and the Declaration of Independence, 33 TEMP. L.Q. 403 (1960).
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the duty of certifying the constitution to be "republican in form". Even
though Congress may not delegate its power to determine whether or not
a State shall be admitted to the Union, the President may act as the mere
agent of the Congress to determine whether the state constitution is re-
publican in form, makes no distinction in race or color, and not repug-
nant to the Constitution of the United States and the principles of the
Declaration of Independence."
History shows that there has been no uniform federal standard for
evaluating and approving State constitutions. Consequently, in 19 cases
the purposed constitutions were submitted directly to Congress for ap-
proval,"0 while in 15 instances these documents were forwarded to the
President for his certification. 7 In the cases of Vermont and Kentucky
there does not appear to be any evidence of either congressional or presi-
dential approval of their new constitutions." In addition, no such ap-
proval was given to Tennessee's constitution,6 9 although its constitution
had been forwarded to the Department of State by the Territorial Gover-
nor in February, 1796.
C. The Equal Footing Doctrine
1. Historical and Constitutional Base
The earliest notion of the equality of States originates in the egalita-
rian rhetoric of the American Revolution and finds its first formal expres-
sion in the Resolve of 1780.70 In the Resolve, Congress urged the States to
make liberal grants of their western lands to be used for the creation and
admission of additional republican States as full members of the confed-
eration enjoying the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and indepen-
dence as the already member States.71 Four years later, this principle of
equality was reaffirmed by the Continental Congress in the Northwest
" See Wickersham, supra note 40, at 31-34.
Congress approved the following state constitutions: Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana,
Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama, Maine, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, Wisconsin, California, Min-
nesota, Oregon, Kansas, Wyoming, Idaho, Alaska, and finally, Hawaii.
6 The President approved the following state constitutions: Michigan, Texas, Florida,
West Virginia, Nebraska, Nevada, Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Wash-
ington, Utah, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona.
68 See EXPERIENCES OF PAST TERRITORIES, supra note 54, at 8 (no enabling act passed to
impose congressional or presidential approval on the constitutions drafted by Vermont and
Kentucky).
69 See EXPERIENCES OF PAST TERRITORIES, supra note 54, at 8 (no enabling act requiring
congressional or presidential approval of Tennessee's constitution).
11 Resolve of Oct. 10, 1780, 3 JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 535 (Washington
1823).
71 Id.
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Ordinance of 178471 which provided for the admission of members into
the Union "on an equal footing with the ... original states."" The same
expression was also included in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787' which
was re-enacted by the First Congress in 1789.11 By passing these
landmark enactments, Congress had willingly offered to convert the ceded
western lands into equal States, using this plan as an inducement to the
large States to undertake the much desired territorial divisions.
During the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, the issue of
State equality was seriously debated when certain factions recommended
the admission of new States with proportionately less representation than
that of the original States based upon the criteria of wealth and popula-
tion. 6 These specific proposals were rejected by the Convention when it
adopted the present system of equal representation in the Senate and by
its express repudiation of the criterion of wealth as contradictory to the
primary goals of American government and society.77 Towards the end of
the Convention, the opponents of equality for new States, having failed in
an effort to discriminate against them on the basis of wealth and popula-
tion, managed to strike from the proposed text of the Constitution a
clause providing for admission of new members "on the same terms with
the original states [sic]".7s Framers of the Constitution deleted this
phrase because they did not want to bind Congress to rigid requirements
for State equality.
70
Circumstances changed as a result of the re-enactment of the Ordi-
nance of 1787 under the new Constitution and by the adoption of the
Tenth Amendment, in 1791. During the national Constitution's ratifica-
tion process, Congress proceeded to re-enact "in toto" the Northwest Or-
dinance of 1787 as the first comprehensive law on the issue of state-
hood. 0 The ratification of the Northwest Ordinance stressed, once again,
Congress' commitment to the admission of States to the Union on an
equal footing with the original States. However, it remained to be seen
whether State equality was a principle primarily dependent on congres-
sional legislation or whether it derived its force from the very nature of
the federal system.
The basis for the enforcement of State equality can be traced back to
the early sessions of the Constitutional Convention, when the faults and
72 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 12, at 121.
'1 Id. at 122.
"I Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (1789).
75 Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. VIII, 1 Stat. 50.
76 1 Farrand, supra note 20, at 559-62.
77 1 Farrand, supra note 20, at 605-06.
78 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 446-47, 454-56.
71 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 454-56.
80 Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. VIII, 1 Stat. 50.
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merits of the Virginia and New Jersey plans were being debated. At that
time, many delegates expressed their desire to keep the sovereignty of all
States equal."s Similarly, other delegates claimed that the unification
under a Federal Government necessarily required an equalization of
States or their elimination as sovereign political entities.8 2 This concern
over States' equality and the integrity of State sovereignty prevailed even
after the Framers had deleted the equality provision proposed in the orig-
inal text of the state's admission clause. 83 As a result, Congress immedi-
ately addressed the issue by drafting the Tenth Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution, which was ratified along with the first Nine
Amendments in late 1791, having the following text: "The powers not del-
egated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States repectively, or to the people."8
Primarily, the passage of this amendment confirmed the very essence
of American Federalism and the Founding Fathers' understanding that
the powers not granted to the national government were reserved to the
States themselves. Even more importantly, the Tenth Amendment in dis-
tinguishing between national and state power provides a constitutional
basis for the principle of State equality in so far as it makes no distinc-
tion between States. Hence, regardless of when admitted to the Union,
each State can claim every right and power that is not delegated to the
Federal Government or prohibited to the States. Therefore, at the mo-
ment a given community becomes entitled to bear the name "State," it
assumes every power which may be exercised by any other community
bearing that same title. Since all states have the same powers reserved in
the Tenth Amendment, there can be no doubt about a constitutional doc-
trine of equal footing.s Following the admission of Tennessee in 1796,
Congress has re-affirmed the principle of state equality by inserting a
clause into the admission enactments of all States entering the Union
providing for their admission "on equal footing with the original, and
other States in all respects whatever." 6
81 1 Farrand, supra note 20, at 249-80.
82 See 1 Farrand, supra note 20, 180-86.
8' 1 Farrand, supra note 20, at 559-62.
8' U.S. CONST. amend. X.
85 See Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories and the
States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REv. 43, 66 (1949).
88 Prior to 1796, Vermont and Kentucky, two states carved out from the territory of
other states, had been admitted individually "as a new and entire member of the United
States of America." See Act of Feb. 18, 1791, ch. VIII, 1 Stat. 191 and Act of Feb. 4, 1791,
ch. IV, 1 Stat. 189. Recently a commentator noted that the language used in both acts of
admission "is so close to the equal footing terminology, although the phrase is not used
explicitly." Note, Statehood and the Equal Footing Doctrine: The Case of Pureto Rican
Seabed Rights, 88 YALE L.J. 825, 836 n.59 (1979). Also, "equal footing" has been referred to
erroneously as a "requirement" for all States upon admission. Serrano-Geyls and Gorrin-
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Despite this constitutional and legislative background, only recently
has the full meaning and extent of the term "equal footing" come to be
known. Based on an historical and legal analysis of the statehood experi-
ence, its relevant jurisprudence and related scholarly literature, it be-
comes clear at the outset that the concept of State equality is not a limit-
less or absolute principle. Throughout the last two centuries, the
following questions have emerged in the process of defining this subject:
(1) What are the limits of State and national sovereignty? (2) What is the
extent to which full equality can be achieved? (3) What limits must Con-
gress face when imposing conditions for admission to statehood in the
Union? (4) Does the Constitution forbid all forms of inequality among
States? (5) Is the principle of State equality applicable to the individual
land grants made to the States as they entered the Union? (6) More spe-
cifically, is the principle of State equality applicable to economic or prop-
erty concessions? Since the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed' these and
other questions while dealing with the subject of equality, the following
pages will attempt to review the most relevant cases in conjunction with
the development of an elaborate set of constitutional principles popularly
known as the Equal Footing Doctrine.
2. The Judicial Interpretations
The landmark case of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan87 established the
first parameters that helped define the Doctrine of Equal Footing for the
States. The Court held that since the original States owned their inland
navigable waters and the soil under these waters, new States which were
subsequently admitted had the same rights of ownership. 8
The United States Supreme Court took this case, regarding it as a
distinct opportunity to define the standards separating the sovereignty
and jurisdiction of the Federal and State Governments. Affirming the de-
cisions of the State courts, the Supreme Court held that: first, the shores
of inland navigable waters, and the soil under them, were not constitu-
tionally granted to the United States, but were reserved to the States
respectively; second, the Court emphasized that new States have the
same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the original
States; and, third, the right of the United States to the public lands, and
the power of Congress to make all necessary rules and regulations for the
sale and disposition of such lands, did not support the grant to the plain-
Peralta, Puerto Rico y La Estadidad: Problemas Construcionales, 40 REv. C. ABo. P.R. 521,
532 (1979) As we shall see, equal footing is not a requirement imposed on States but rather
a constitutional principle applicable to Congress.
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
Id. at 230.
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tiff of the land in controversy which was below usual high water marks at
the time Alabama was admitted into the Union.89
Furthermore, the Court also stated that the Enabling Act,'" in trying
to maintain free navigable waters, was nothing more than the valid exer-
cise of a constitutional power to regulate commerce which was already
vested in Congress." The exercise of this power would have been binding
on the people of the new State whether or not they consented to be
bound. Thus, although the Enabling Act was a valid exercise of constitu-
tional power, it fell short of granting title over the lands to the Federal
Government.
Essentially, this case held that each new State is to be admitted into
the Union with all of the powers and sovereignty that pertain to the origi-
nal States. In addition, such powers may not be constitutionally dimin-
ished or impaired by Congress through compacts, conditions or stipula-
tions embraced in the admission enactment. By holding that property
rights in the beds of inland waters are conferred exclusively to the States,
the Supreme Court gave impetus to one of the most bitter debates on the
issue of equal standing, whether the States have equality with respect to
landholding.
During the same period as the Pollard decision, the Supreme Court
considered Permoli v. New Orleans.'2 Permoli involved a controversy over
the religious liberties of the inhabitants of the State of Louisiana. Most
importantly, however, this case clarified the result that the laws, norms
and legal dispositions in force during a land's territorial period cease to
have an effect after the admission of a State into the Union.'8
In Permoli, the Catholic Church challenged a city ordinance " as vio-
lating Louisiana's Enabling Act."' The third section of the Act provided
that the new State constitution should "contain the fundamental princi-
ples of civil and religious liberty."' Also, the Act of 1812 (State Admis-
sion Act) provided "that all the conditions and terms contained in said
third section should be considered, deemed and taken as fundamental
conditions and terms, upon which the said State is incorporated in the
Union."'17 Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that the city's regulation vi-
89 Id.
00 Act of Mar. 2, 1819, ch. XLVI, 3 Stat. 488.
01 44 U.S. (3 How.) 230 (1845).
" 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
" Id. at 610.
See, id. at 590, for text of the ordinance promulgated by the governing body of New
Orleans prohibiting, for health reasons, the celebration of mass for the dead in the city's
Roman Catholic Cathedral.
Act of Feb. 20, 1811, ch. XXI, 2 Stat. 641.
Id. at § 3.
Act of April 8, 1812, ch. L, 2 Stat. 701, 703.
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olated those religious liberty provisions found in the Ordinance of 1787
which were applicable to the Territory of Orleans.
Conversely, representatives of the city of New Orleans argued that
the Ordinance of 1787 was not in effect in the State of Louisiana. The
State constitution did not provide for religious liberties, nor did the Fed-
eral Constitution's First Amendment provisions apply to the States at
that time. 8 Therefore, they argued that Congress was not constitutionally
authorized to extend the religious liberty provision contained in the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 to the newly admitted State.
The Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction over the issue,"
but in so holding it strongly suggested that Congress also lacked the con-
stitutional power to impose a similar standard. 100 Since Congress had ac-
cepted the state constitution and admitted the state to the Union, it was
precluded from assuming that the state legislature had not complied with
the Act of 1811. Congress could not, then, add any fundamental princi-
ples by way of amendment, since this would constitute drafting the state
constitution itself.10
1
Two years later, the Supreme Court reached a similar decision in the
case of Scott v. Jones'02 in which the powers of Michigan's state de facto
legislature were challenged on the grounds that it had passed legislation
prior to the State's admission. The enactment was declared valid by
Michigan's Supreme Court and the decision was then taken on appeal to
the U.S. Supreme Court. Although, seven of the nine U.S. Supreme Court
justices concurred in the opinion that the action was not cognizable, the
majority, by way of dicta, strongly suggested that a State could exist as a
political entity prior to its admission. 08 Furthermore, the Court held that
once a State is admitted into the Union, the Federal Government and the
courts must regard its statutes "as they would the statutes of any other
State" under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
0 4
The issue of State equality lay dormant for the next 30 years as the
Nation became immersed in the turbulent era of the Civil War and Re-
construction. The outcome of that conflict was responsible for destroying
the established theory of States rights, as well as dispelling the notion of
an association of friendly States bound by a compact which could be uni-
'8 We should note that the right to due process of law and its concomitant protection of
civil liberties was not made applicable to the States until at least 1868 with the passage of
the 14th Amendment. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (holding that the
1st Amendment applies to the states through the 14th).
" 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 610.
1o Id.
'01 Id. at 609-10.
101 46 U.S. (5 How.) 343 (1847).
'o3 Id. at 374.
'°' Id. at 378.
1981
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laterally abrogated. On this subject Edmund Steele Joy explained:
The conflict of opinion regarding the nature of the American Union was
settled by the Civil War. Many held before that time, that the Nation
was the result of a compact entered into by free and independent States,
which, while recognizing the Constitution as a common bond of union,
yet left to each State as a part of an inherent sovereignty, the right either
to nullify a national obligation or to withdraw without the circle of
national influence and power.
This conception of the Union, which is known as the states-rights doc-
trine, was adopted by the Southern States, and their deliberate acts of
secession were the immediate cause of the Civil War and all its attending
disasters.
But with the defeat of the South the dogma of state-rights perished.
Henceforth the Constitution is to be viewed, not as a compact between
sovereign States, but as the fundamental law of the whole land-as the
expression of the will of the entire Nation-and arguments relating to it
must be based' upon that fundamental conception.105
In many respects, the Civil War had served to strengthen the struc-
ture of American federalism. The Civil War resulted in a definition of the
limits of State sovereignty and an emphasis on the permanency of the
Union. Yet, the issue of State equality and the precise delineation of the
reserved powers were still subjects of litigation.
In U.S. v. McBratney'0s the defendant, a white man, had been con-
victed of murdering another man within the boundaries of the Ute Reser-
vation, an Indian territory located within the State of Colorado. The Su-
preme Court reduced the issue to whether the Federal courts had
jurisdiction over a case involving a crime committed "within the geo-
graphical limits of the State of Colorado. '10 7 The Act made no reference
to the Ute Reservation or to the State's jurisdiction over it. The Supreme
Court held that Congress may decide to exclude an Indian reservation
from a State being admitted to the Union or retain jurisdiction over it.
However, such a congressional decision must be expressed rather than in-
ferred.108 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the State of Colorado,
by its admission to the Union, had acquired criminal jurisdiction over its
own citizens, including the Ute Reservation. The courts of the United
States, therefore, had no jurisdiction to punish crimes within that reser-
vation, except to the extent necessary to carry out the provisions of the
treaty with the Ute Indians.10' Therefore, upon the admission of any
105 E. Joy, supra note 22, at 5.
-06 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
'1 Id. at 624.
los Id. at 623-24.
109 Id. at 624.
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State, Congress has the authority to include those conditions which it has
the constitutional power to implement, provided that the conditions be
expressly and clearly verbalized.
In an additional case, Escanaba Company v. Chicago,"' the Supreme
Court opinion interprets the parameters of state sovereignty and equality.
This case involved a petition to enjoin the City of Chicago from enforcing
a municipal ordinance that prevented, for a few hours daily, the passage
of vessels under numerous bridges built along the course of the Chicago
River.
By affirming the lower court's judgment in favor of the City of Chi-
cago, the Supreme Court further supported the standards for equal foot-
ing first considered in the case of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan."' The Court
explained that the exercise of government power to regulate interstate
commerce as involved "the control of the waters of the United States
which are navigable in fact . . when by themselves or their connection
with other waters they form a continuous channel for commerce among
the States or with foreign countries."" 2 Recognizing police power as one
of the major attributes of State sovereignty, the Court went on to clarify
that the State may exercise its plenary police powers so long as its actions
do not conflict with congressional legislation on the matter." 3 Thus, as
long as the subject is not preempted by federal legislation, the States can
exercise the police powers inherent in their individual sovereignty.
The Court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that the Federal
Government had pre-empted the issue with the provisions of the North-
west Ordinance which stipulated that no tax, impost or duty was to be
imposed upon the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi River," 4
of which the Chicago River was a tributary. The Court answered this ar-
gument by stating that the limitation upon the State's powers as a gov-
ernment, whether from the Ordinance of 1787 or congressional legislation,
ceased, upon admission to the Union, to have any force except as volunta-
rily adopted. The State was held to have been admitted on an equal foot-
ing with the original 13 States "in all respects whatever."" 5 Here, as in
Pollard's Lessee, the Supreme Court suggested that equal footing implied
parity in proprietary interests and rights of dominion "in all respects
whatever."" 6
At this point it is appropriate to mention the decision rendered in
107 U.S. 678 (1882).
. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
.. 107 U.S. 678, 682 (1882).
113 Id. at 683.
114 Id. at 688-90.
"' Id. at 688-89.
" Id. at 689.
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Case v. Toftus,"7 a Federal Circuit Court case, which appears to have
played a significant role in modifying the Supreme Court's position on
the subject of equality of States and proprietary interests. In that case, a
suit was brought enjoining the defendant from constructing a tramway on
the tidelands in Oregon's Pacific Coast.
The Circuit Court overruled the defendant's'1 8 demurrer which chal-
lenged plaintiff's title to the lands, but still held that the tidelands be-
longed to the State Government from which the plaintiff had acquired
title.' 1 ' On reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that equal footing
does not entail equality of rights in the soil."20 Furthermore, the Court
stated that, as a general rule, Congress holds title to all lands lying in the
territories unless it has disposed of them by appropriate legislation.'" On
this issue the opinion reads:
The doctrine that new states must be admitted into the Union on an
equal footing with the old ones ... does not require that the new state
shall be admitted to any right in the soil thereof considered as property.
The ante-Revolution states acquired no property in the soil thereof by
entering into the Union. The lands that had not passed into pfivate
hands they already owned and held, as the political successors of the
British crown.
The true constitutional equality between the states only extends to the
right of each, under the constitution, to have and enjoy the same mea-
sure of local or self government, and to be admitted to an equal partici-
pation in the maintenance, administration, and conduct of the common
or national government.
The soil of Oregon was acquired by the national government by means of
the discoveries, explorations, and occupation of the citizens of the United
States; and it was so acquired for the benefit of all, and not a part.
In the territories the national government is both the sovereign and pro-
prietor. Congress has the power to govern them, and in so doing exercises
the combined power of the nation and state governments . . . And as
such sovereign and proprietor it may dispose absolutely of all the public
land in the territory, whether high or low, wet or dry. For the time being,
as sovereign, it has the 'jus publicum' or right of jurisdiction and control,
of the shores for the benefit of the public, as in the case of a public high-
way over private land; while as proprietor it has the 'jus privatum', or
right of private property, subject to the 'jus publicum' . . . . This 'jus
publicum', whether held by the national government during the territo-
11 39 F. 730 (C.C.D. Ore. 1889).
"8 Id. at 734.
"9 Id. at 733-34.
M20 Id. at 732.
'2' Id. at 733.
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rial period or the state thereafter, may be sold or disposed of by the
legislature of either, who represent the public.'21 '
Contrary to the opinion rendered by the United States Supreme
Court in the cases of Pollard's Lessee and Permoli, in Case a Federal
Circuit Court held that equal footing does not refer to proprietary nor
economic equality.122 This decision challenged, for the first time, the con-
cept of state equality in "all respects whatever," as previously developed
by the Supreme Court.122 It is interesting that the Court never mentioned
the fact that Oregon's Act of Admission, when establishing the bounda-
ries of the new State, recognized a single maritime league jurisdiction
from the coastline including all islands within that limit. Therefore, Con-
gress had actually disposed of its property up to the aforementioned dis-
tance by vesting it in the State upon the State's admission into the
Union. 24 It should be noted, however, that additional attention will be
focused on this decision during the discussion of the development of the
Equal Footing Doctrine at the national level.
In another area of discussion, in Ward v. Race Horse,'2' the Supreme
Court considered whether the Federal Government can limit the attrib-
utes of State sovereignty by the terms of a treaty made prior to the ad-
mission of the affected State. The appellee, a member of the Bannock
Tribe of Indians, had been arrested for hunting in violation of an act
passed by the Wyoming State Legislature severely curtailing the killing of
game within the State. Wyoming's Admission Act' s" contained no excep-
tion or reservation in favor of or for the benefit of Indians. Therefore, the
State argued that the treaty was no longer applicable because it violated
the State law passed as an exercise of its municipal authority. The lower
court disregarded the State's claim that admission as a State of the Union
on an equal footing with the rest of the States gave it power to control
hunting within its boundaries, and released the appellee from custody in
a federal habeas corpus proceeding. On appeal, the Supreme Court re-
versed the decision and held that Congress could not impair or diminish
the police powers of the State without violating the equal footing
requirements.'
Four years later, in the case of Stearns v. Minnesota,'28 the U.S. Su-
preme Court followed the lead established by the U.S. Circuit Court in
121.1 Id.
"22 Id. at 732.
'21 See, e.g., Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 689.
"' Act of Feb. 14, 1859, ch. XXXIII, 11 Stat, 383.
"' 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
126 Act of July 10, 1890, ch. 664, 26 Stat. 222.
12 163 U.S. at 314-15.
128 179 U.S. 223 (1900).
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Case v. Toftus, 129 and fully endorsed the position that equal footing refers
to political rights rather than to property and economic rights.130 The
federal question dealt with in Stearns was whether a statute approved by
Minnesota's State Legislature in 18951" impaired a contract previously
supported by the State and certain railroad companies to the effect that
the latter should pay a fixed percent of their gross earnings in lieu of
taxes on all their property including State lands obtained from the Fed-
eral Government upon Minnesota's admission into the Union. A new stat-
ute replaced the basis for taxation from gross earnings to that of the cash
value of such properties. The companies questioned the power of the
State to adopt such legislation because one of Minnesota's enabling act
provisions prohibited the State from interfering with the primary disposal
of the soil within its boundaries, or with any regulations which Congress
might pass to secure title from bona fide purchasers; and, in addition,
exempted such lands from State taxes. The State, on the other hand,
claimed that the restrictions violated its inherent power to tax lands
within its boundaries, thus infringing upon its basic sovereignty as an
equal member of the Union.
In addressing the issues, the Supreme Court held that the Minnesota
Legislature had the power to pass property tax laws affecting its citizens
so long as they did not deprive the claimants of their proprietary rights
gained through contract without due process of law. 1 2 . When the Su-
preme Court examined the nature and validity of the congressional en-
abling act it made a distinction between the purely political and proprie-
tary provisions found in such types of congressional enactments.
That these provisions of the enabling act and the constitution, in
form at least, made a compact between the United States and the State,
is evident. In an inquiry as to the validity of such a compact this distinc-
tion must at the outset be noticed. There may be agreements or com-
pacts attempted to be entered into beween two States, or between a
State and the nation, in reference to political rights and obligations, and
there may be those solely in reference to property belonging to one or the
other. That different considerations may underlie the question as to the
validity of these two kinds of compacts or agreements is obvious. It has
often been said that a State admitted into the Union enters therein in
full equality with all the others, and such equality may forbid any agree-
ment or compact limiting or qualifying political rights and obligations;
whereas, on the other hand, a mere agreement in reference to property
involves no question of equality of status, but only of the power of a
State to deal with the nation or with any other State in reference to such
,' 39 F. 730 (C.C.D. Ore. 1889).
,' 179 U.S. at 245.
13' Act of Mar. 19, 1895, ch. 168, 1895 Minn. Laws 378.
,II 179 U.S. at 238-40.
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property. The case before us is one involving simply an agreement as to
property between a State and the nation. 133
Therefore, the conditions imposed by Congress in the admission or
enabling act of a new State are valid as long as they do not deprive the
new State of political equality with other States. These conditions are not
binding upon the State unless they constitute a recognition of the limita-
tions upon State power under the national Constitution. However, if the
conditions refer to proprietary agreements or settlements, they would
generally be valid as a contract between two sovereign entities, i.e., the
State and the Federal Government, which have power and standing to
enter into agreements. Hence, Congress can be generous or exacting in
the process of transferring federal property to the new State upon its ad-
mission to the Union. In addition, Congress may grant to each State dif-
ferent amounts and values of public lands and property, without violating
the constitutional principle of State equality.' 8'
The leading case in the field of equal footing is Coyle v. Oklahoma,35
an unprecedented opinion in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a State, statute which expressly violated a specific
condition of admission imposed by Congress in that State's enabling
act.' ss In Coyle, the Act of 1906, which empowered the inhabitants of
Oklahoma to form a State government, contained a clause designating the
City of Guthrie as the provisional site of the new State government and
proscribed any change of site of the capital city until the year 1913.187
Even though the State constitution did not contain any provision relating
to the location of the city, Oklahoma's constitutional convention was
forced to adopt a separate ordinance irrevocably accepting the terms and
conditions stated in the enabling act. Subsequently, yet within the pro-
scribed period, the State of Oklahoma, through a legislative action, relo-
cated its capital from Guthrie to Oklahoma City and appropriated public
funds to erect new State buildings in the new location. 8
Such a change in the State capital was in clear violation of the condi-
tions imposed by Congress upon the admission of the State.'3s As a result,
a group of business and property interests from the City of Guthrie chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Removal Act as being in violation of
"'3 Id. at 244-45.
134 See also Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517 (1877) and Minnesota v. Bachelder, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 109 (1863).
.1s6 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
1s1 Id. at 574-80.
137 Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267.
136 Removal Act, ch. 5, 1910 Okla. Sess. Laws 4.
"3' Oklahoma was admitted on November 16, 1907 pursuant to a Presidential Procla-
Aiation, Pres. Proc. of Nov. 16, 1907, 35 Stat. 2160, which was authorized by the enabling act
passed in 1906, Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267.
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Oklahoma's terms of admission. The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Capital Removal Act14 and the plaintiffs ap-
pealed through a writ of error.
The appellants argued that the powers of Congress to admit new
States and to determine whether or not their constitutions are republican
in form were political powers and as such uncontrollable by the courts.
Hence, Congress, in the exercise of such powers, could impose terms and
conditions that would constitutionally restrict the State's authority even
if those same powers were otherwise enjoyed by the other members of the
Union.1 4 ' Conversely, the State argued that the condition imposed by
Congress had no legal effect because the Federal Government had no con-
stitutional authority to locate the State's seat of government. Further-
more, the State claimed that the supposedly "irrevocable ordinance"
passed by the convention did not constitute a surrender of State sover-
eignty because the power to locate the capital lay in the people them-
selves and their chosen representatives. Since the State legislature was
not bound by precedent, the Removal Act constituted a legitimate exer-
cise of the State's reserved power. Thus, once Oklahoma had been admit-
ted as an equal member of the Union, the enabling act's restrictive clause
ceased to have effect.1
42
The U.S. Supreme Court was presented with the issue of whether the
provision in the enabling act was a valid limitation upon the powers of
the State after its admission. By affirming the lower court's judgment and
upholding the constitutionality of the State law, the Court impliedly an-
swered the question in the negative by declaring void the enabling act's
restriction as an ultra vires congressional enactment. 4 '
Justice Lurton, writing for the majority, reasoned that the power to
determine its own seat of government is essentially a State power and one
which could not be removed from the original 13 States."4 The Court
held that Congress, when admitting new States into the Union, can im-
pose only those conditions which it may have the constitutional power to
enforce directly or which are incidental to the Federal Government's own
sovereignty.'4 In its analysis of the congressional power to admit new
States into the Union and the concept of equality of States, the Court
stated that the admission of new States into the Union is not mandatory,
but rather it is discretionary with Congress. Thus, Congress may require
140 Coyle v. Smith, 28 Okla. 121, 113 P. 944 (1911).
' 221 U.S. at 565.
142 The merits of the case were amply discussed in a legal periodical six months before
the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument. Monnet, Violation by a State of the Condi-
tions of Its Enabling Act, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 591 (1910).
"' 221 U.S. at 574-80.
'4 Id. at 565.
145 Id. at 565-66.
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that the organic laws of the new State meet its approval before granting
admission to the Union. The constitution, however, would be the consti-
tution of a State, not an act of Congress 146 and as such it would remain
subject to alteration or amendment.
Thereafter, the Court reviewed its own previous pronouncements on
the issue of equality and concluded that restrictions involving rights of
property, navigation title and disposition of public lands, navigable wa-
ters, regulation of commerce, Indian affairs, and the power to tax were all
valid limitations imposed within the sphere of congressional power. Thus,
"whatever force such provisions have after the admission of the State
may be attributed to the power of Congress over the subjects, derived
from other provisions of the constitution, rather than from any consent
by or compact with the State. 1 4 7 However, if the Federal Government
lacks the power over the subject matter, that authority has been reserved
to the States and Congress cannot impair State sovereignty by reason of
the terms of admission:
When a new State is admitted into the Union, it is so admitted with all
of the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to the origi-
nal States, and that such powers may not be constitutionally deminished
[sic], impaired or shorn away by any conditions, compacts or stipulations
embraced in the act under which the new State came into the Union,
which would not be valid and effectual if the subject of congressional
legislation after admission.1 4
Finally, the Court ended its opinion by stressing the constitutional
nature of the principle of State equality and placing its roots within the
structure of American federalism by stating that "[w]hen that [State]
equality disappears we may remain a free people, but the Union will not
be the Union of the Constitution.
14
'
9
The practical effects of the constitutional parameters set by Coyle
became evident immediately after the opinion had been released in May,
1911, with the emergence of a controversy stemming from Arizona's bid
for statehood. The admission of that Territory had been delayed for
months because of objections raised in Congress and in the executive
branch against a clause in the state's proposed constitution which pro-
vided for the popular recall of judges. The constitution, with this contro-
versial provision, had been overwhelmingly ratified by the citizens of Ari-
zona on February 9, 1911.150 Congress was immediately petitioned to pass
'" Id. at 566-68.
"4 Id. at 570.
148 Id. at 573.
"4 Id. at 580.
150 The constitution was approved by a vote of 12,584 to 3,920. See 1 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 301 (W. Swindler ed. 1973).
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a joint resolution for the admission of Arizona and New Mexico (which
had also adopted a constitution) as States of the Union. Such a resolution
was passed on August 10th of the same year"'1 but President Taft, a for-
mer judge himself, vetoed the measure claiming that the recall of judges
provision in Arizona's constitution was not compatible with the require-
ment of a "republican form of government," specified in the federal
Constitution."2
On August 21, 1911, three months after the Coyle opinion had been
rendered, Congress passed another joint resolution by which it tried to
impose the Federal Government's will.158 The resolution required that
before Arizona could be admitted its citizens had to vote upon and ratify
an amendment to the constitution exempting members of the judiciary
from the recall provision.15" Four months later, the citizens of Arizona
complied with the burdensome condition imposed by ratifying the change
exempting the judges from popular recall.155 This alteration in the consti-
tution did not last for, in a referendum approximately one year after Ari-
zona had been admitted as a State, its people reinstated the recall clause
in the constitution in defiance of the congressional condition set forth in
the Joint Resolution of Admission.156 In so doing, Arizona had joined
Oklahoma as the only two States to have clearly violated unconstitutional
conditions set by Congress after their admission as full and equal mem-
bers of the Union. Arizona's voters had refused to surrender one of the
State's inherent powers, claiming that the appointment and election of
judges is one of the vital and essential attributes of State sovereignty
solely reserved to Arizona in its capacity as an equal member of the
Union. Since Congress had overstepped its constitutional authority, it be-
came powerless to act against the State's rejection of one of the condi-
tions of admission. The Equal Footing Doctrine had just been tested to
its limits as an effective check on congressional actions in admitting new
member States into the Union.
3. Equal Footing and the Submerged Lands Issue
Despite this extensive legal background, the controversy over the ex-
act nature of States' equality did not end with Coyle and its aftermath.
During the late 1940's, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a series of
181 H.R.J. Res. 14, 62d Cong., 1st Sess. (1911).
'6, President's Veto Message of Aug. 11, 1911, 47 CONG. REc. 3964 (1911), reprinted in
1 Swindler, supra note 150, at 301.
" Resolution of Aug. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 39.
Id. at 42.
'"The citizens of Arizona voted to repeal the judicial recall provision by a vote of
14,963 to 1,980. See 1 Swindler, supra note 150, at 301.
' See 1 Swindler, supra note 150, at 301.
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cases, commonly known as The Tidelands Oil Cases, which dealt with the
question of ownership of marginal sea and other maritime resources un-
derlying certain coastal States on the mainland. Throughout the decade,
States including California, Texas and Louisiana had negotiated and exe-
cuted leases with persons and corporations authorizing them to extract
oil, gas, and mineral deposits from the submerged land. The Federal Gov-
ernment instituted suits against these States following the policy set by
the Truman Proclamation of September 8, 1945,' 7 which declared that
the "Government of the United States regards the natural resources of
the subsoil of the sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas
but contiguous to the coast of the United States as appertaining to the
United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control."' 58 The proclama-
tion was complemented by an Executive order which directed that the
submerged lands be placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of
the Interior pending the enactment of appropriate Federal legislation and
the resolution of any future judicial controversy between the States and
the central government regarding ownership and control over these
areas. '5 In these suits, the Federal Government claimed title and "para-
mount rights" over all submerged lands lying seaward of the ordinary low
water mark on the coasts and outside the inland waters. In all cases, the
States claimed that like the original thirteen colonies, subsequent to ad-
mission into the Union on an equal footing with the other States, they
had acquired ownership over these areas.
In the first case of the Tideland's triolgy, United States v. Califor-
nia,10 decided on June 23, 1947, the Court held that since the Thirteen
Original Colonies had never acquired ownership of the lands under the
marginal sea, no State has sovereignty rights over such lands.' 6 ' The Su-
preme Court read Pollard's Lessee as determining only that State sover-
eignty on an equal footing covered ownership and control over submerged
lands underlying inland navigable waters. However, the submerged lands
and natural resources beneath the oceans fell within the control and juris-
diction of the Federal Government, which had paramount rights over
them. Thus, the Court apparently attributed proprietary significance to
the Equal Footing Doctrine exclusively in terms of land underlying inland
navigable waters.
Three years later, in the second case of the Tidelands triad, United
States v. Louisiana,'5 the Court reaffirmed the California rationale while
,6 Pres. Proc. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
168 Id.
159 Exec. Order No. 9633, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (1945).
160 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
... Id. at 31-34.
,62 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
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rejecting Louisiana's bid to obtain recognition of her historic claim over
its marginal sea and resources.1 3
The Tidelands trilogy was completed with United States v. Texas,164
a case in which the State of Texas tried to distinguish its situation from
that of California and Louisiana. In brief, representatives for the State
argued that its previous status as an independent republic had conferred
upon it title and control over the submerged lands under its coast of up
to a distance of three marine leagues. Hence, when admitted into the
Union, Texas argued that the State had retained its proprietary rights
over those areas while at the same time it had transferred the power to
regulate and control to the Federal Government. Additionally, the state
claimed that Congress had recognized this legal reality and the Texas sea-
ward boundary by admitting the state on an equal footing with the other
states. Since the United States never held Texas as a territory and since
the Republic allowed the vacant and unappropriated lands within its
boundaries to remain part of the state, Texas reasoned that, through the
Joint Resolution annexing it to the Union, 65 Congress had fully recog-
nized its property rights over the area in dispute.
These arguments were all rejected in an opinion written by a four
member plurality of the Supreme Court. The Court found that the equal
footing clause of the Joint Resolution of Admission was dispositive of the
controversy. The Court reasoned:
The 'equal footing' clause has long been held to refer to political rights
and to sovereignty. See Stearns v. Minnesota ... It does not, of course,
include economic stature or standing. There has never been equality
among the States in that sense. Some States when they entered the
Union had within their boundaries tracts of land belonging to the Fed-
eral Government; others were sovereigns of their soil. Some had special
agreements with the Federal Government governing property within
their borders. See Stearns v. Minnesota, supra, . . . Area, location, geol-
ogy and latitude have created great diversity in the economic aspects of
the several States. The requirement of equal footing was designed not to
wipe out those diversities but to create parity as respects political stand-
ing and sovereignty.
Yet the 'equal footing' clause has long been held to have a direct
effect on certain property rights. Thus the question early arose in contro-
versies between the Federal Government and the States as to the owner-
ship of the shores of navigable waters and the soils under them. It was
consistently held that to deny the States, admitted subsequent to the
formation of the Union, ownership of this property would deny them ad-
mission on an equal footing with the original States, since the original
'' Id. at 704-05.
339 U.S. 707 (1950).
'" Joint Resolution of Dec. 29, 1845, Res. 1, 9 Stat. 108.
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States did not grant these properties to the United States but reserved
them to themselves. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan ...
The 'equal footing' clause, we hold, works the same way in the con-
verse situation presented by this case. It negatives an implied, special
limitation of any of the paramount powers of the United States in favor
of'a State.
• ..We hold that as an incident to the transfer of that sovereignty any
claim that Texas may have had to the marginal sea was relinquished to
the United States.
It is said that there is no necessity for it-that the sovereignty of the
sea can be complete and unimpaired no matter if Texas owns the oil
underlying it. Yet, as pointed out in United States v. California, once
low-water mark is passed the international domain is reached. Property
rights must then be so subordinated to political rights as in substance to
coalesce and unite in the national sovereign. Today the controversy is
over oil. Tomorrow it may be over some other substance or mineral or
perhaps the bed of the ocean itself. If the property, whatever it may be,
lies seaward of low-water mark, its use, disposition, management, and
control involve national interests and national responsibilities. That is
the source of national rights in it. Such is the rationale of the California
decision, which we have applied to Louisiana's case. The same result
must be reached here if 'equal footing' with the various States is to be
achieved. Unless any claim or title which the Republic of Texas had to
the marginal sea is subordinated to this full paramount power of the
United States on admission, there is or may be in practical effect a sub-
traction in favor of Texas from the national sovereignty of the United
States. Yet neither the original thirteen States ... nor California nor
Louisiana enjoys such an advantage. The 'equal footing' clause prevents
extension of the sovereignty of a State into a domain of political and
sovereign power of the United States from which the other States have
been excluded, just as it prevents a contraction of sovereignty (Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan.. .) which would produce inequality among the States.
For equality of States means that they are not 'less or greater, or differ-
ent in dignity of power.' See Coyle v. Smith. . .There is no need to take
evidence to establish that meaning of 'equal footing."'"
The Court once again emphasized that equal footing does not imply
equality in economic stature or standing. The Court recognized the his-
torical fact that most states have entered the Union with disparate eco-
nomic arrangements and with dissimilar economic situations when com-
pared with the other members of the Union. Similarly, the plurality
opinion once again indicated that the proprietary effects of equal footing
apply exclusively to inland submerged lands. Hence, as a general rule,
10 339 U.S. at 716-20.
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this constitutional doctrine only applies the principle of equality to politi-
cal rights and sovereignty.1 67
According to the plurality opinion, the Equal Footing Doctrine, in
addition to operating as a constitutional deterrent on congressional
power, can also operate as a legal barrier which prevents the extension of
the sovereignty of a state into the sovereign domain of the nation.'68 Fur-
thermore, the wording used by the Court seems to suggest that control
and proprietary rights over submerged coastal lands were inherent attrib-
utes of national sovereignty which could not be ceded, relinquished, or
given away, even with the consent of the Federal Government.'6 9 In fact,
this stringent position taken by the Court overlooked Congress constitu-
tional powers to administer and dispose of all federal property and terri-
tory. Thus, the question arose as to whether Congress could legislate and
transfer to the individual states its property rights over the coastal sub-
merged lands without surrendering its national sovereignty and other
paramount rights, in violation of the principles of equal footing. The
Texas reasoning resurfaced a few years later as an argument against the
constitutionality of federal legislation dealing with seabed rights and mar-
itime jurisdiction. 7 0
The Submerged Lands Act'7 ' provided an opportunity for a judicial
reaffirmation of the basic principles of State and National sovereignty
and for the expeditious resolution of the questions raised by the Tide-
lands triad. By means of this Act, the Federal Government reaffirmed its
claim over the nation's coastal resources, while at the same time vesting
title of the marginal sea and submerged lands in the coastal States, up to
a distance of three geographical miles from their shores. The Act allowed
the courts to ascertain whether particular Gulf States could prove
through historical evidence their claims to title or jurisdiction beyond the
three mile belt, without exceeding a distance of three marine leagues. In
practical terms, by relinquishing at least some property and sovereignty
rights over coastal submerged lands, this congressional enactment created
three different categories of states with regard to their maritime rights:
(1) coastal states with a three mile geographical seaward boundary (con-
stituting a majority of States); (2) Gulf of Mexico States which could suc-
cessfully prove in court their rights over an extended jurisdiction up to a
distance of three marine leagues from their shores (subsequently only
Texas and Florida could prove their claims in court); and (3) those states
having no access to an ocean, sea or Great Lake, thus lacking seaward
'6 Id. at 716.
108 Id. at 719.
109 Id. at 717-20.
17o See Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
.7, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-43 (1976).
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jurisdiction of their own. Hence, the Submerged Lands Act resulted in an
unequal distribution of land which the Supreme Court had declared to be
under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the Federal Government in
the Tidelands controversy."'
The constitutionality of the Submerged Lands Act was immediately
challenged in the case of Alabama v. Texas. 17 Alabama claimed that the
resources under the marginal sea did not constitute national "property"
as such, but resources to which the United States had exclusive para-
mount rights under the Tidelands rulings. Specifically, the petitioners ar-
gued that the paramount rights over these lands were held in trust for all
of the States as a federal responsibility and that "to cede them to individ-
ual states would take away the 'equal footing' among states by extending
state power into the domain of national responsibility".17 4 In a brief per
curiam decision, without directly referring to equal footing issue, the Su-
preme Court denied the motion to file a complaint. The Court with only
three remaining members of the majority in the Tidelands trilogy, sum-
marily upheld the constitutionality of the Submerged Lands Act on the
ground that Congress has unlimited power, under the property clause of
the Federal Constitution, to dispose of any kind of property belonging to
the United States. Furthermore, the Court stated, "the power over the
public lands thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations. And it is
not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered.' '17 Thus,
the Supreme Court of the United States had placed the seaward sub-
merged lands of the Nation beyond the Equal Footing Doctrine, and in so
doing it tacitly overturned the Texas ruling in so far as that case seemed
to forbid in any cession of submerged lands to the individual states. Con-
sequently, the country's coastal submerged lands were to be considered
national domain subject to the will of Congress which could segregate,
cede and transfer title and property rights to the individual states in the
way and extent that it might deem most appropriate.176
By 1960, following the procedure established by the Submerged
Lands Act, certain Gulf States, including Florida and Texas, had again
brought separate actions against the Federal Government seeking to
prove their maritime jurisdiction beyond the three mile limit imposed by
that Act. In the parallel cases of United States v. Louisiana177 and
1 2 The Act constituted a legislative recall intended to remedy certain controversial ef-
fects of the Tidelands trilogy. See S. REP. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in
[19531 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1474, 1481.
.73 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
4 Id. at 274.
1I d. at 273.
"' Affirmed in United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
.77 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
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United States v. Florida,17 8 the Supreme Court held that a State's
preadmission of maritime boundaries, standing alone, does not suffice to
establish a State's rights to offshore submerged lands. 179 As a result, the
Court added a test beyond a State's preadmission boundaries and focused
on whether subsequent congressional approval of a State boundary, in ex-
cess of three geographical miles, served to validate such a claim."'0
In the first of these cases, the Court held, pursuant to the joint reso-
lution of Congress for annexation of Texas, that the State's boundaries
were not defined, but were left for Congress to settle at a time after ad-
mission to the Union and as questions of boundaries might arise with
other countries.8 ' Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court found that the
Senate had acknowledged Texas' jurisdiction when it ratified the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hildalgo,s2 in 1848, in which Article V fixed the boundary
as extending into the gulf three leagues from the coast.183 Texas, there-
fore, had proven that Congress, in 1848, had vested upon the State the
rights to seaward resources not previously granted to any other State.
In the second of these two cases, Florida's claim was based upon its
assertion that subsequent to its secession at the time of the Civil War, as
a confederate rebel state, it framed a constitution which established a
three league boundary along its Gulf Coast. Florida argued that this
boundary was ratified when Congress approved the State's constitution
and readmitted it to the Union. Therefore, Florida claimed to have ful-
filled the requirements of the Submerged Lands Act by having a three
league limit at the time of admission, as well as the previous congres-
sional approval of such a boundary.
The Reconstruction Acts of 1867" had purported to "provide for
the more efficient Government of the Rebel States,"8 ' language which
was quoted in the preamble to Florida's "Admission Act" of 1868.186
Thus, since Florida's act of readmission was directly linked to Congress
stated intent to incorporate and approve the laws of the former Confeder-
ate States under the Reconstruction Acts, Congress' approval of Florida's
363 U.S. 121 (1960).
363 U.S. at 30.
"8 Id at 35-36.
181 Id. at 50.
'8' Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922, T.S.
No. 207.
183 See 363 U.S. at 58-65 for the text of art. V and the Court's discussion of its effect on
the case.
184 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428; Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2; Act
of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14.
18 The full title of the Act of Mar. 2, 1867 is "An Act to provide for the more efficient
government of the Rebel States."
188 Act of June 25, 1868, ch. LXX, 15 Stat. 73.
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Constitution in 1868 included the three league boundary. The Court sup-
ported this argument by holding that the congressional approval of the
State's new constitution upon its readmission into the Union constituted
precisely the type of consent which the Submerged Lands Act contem-
plated.187 Florida then became the second State to acquire a Gulf of
Mexico jurisdiction in excess of the usual three mile limit.
Even though the equal footing issue was not directly addressed in
either of these two cases, in practical terms the Court had not only reaf-
firmed the validity of the Submerged Lands Act, but once again it had
also placed the maritime submerged lands of the Nation beyond the equal
footing requirement. In addition, the Court reaffirmed the power of Con-
gress to dispose of the national property, without any restrictions, along
with its power to grant extensive and unequal economic concessions, in-
cluding the cession of coastal submerged lands, in the admission process
of new States entering the Union.
4. The Doctrinal Component
For many decades, the Equal Footing Doctrine has been a trouble-
some and confusing constitutional concept, baffling students of the politi-
cal sciences and legal scholars alike. To a significant degree, the lack of a
clear understanding of this elemental principle stems from the absence of
express constitutional wording which would clearly require equality
among the States. The fact that the Framers of the Federal Constitution
deliberately omitted words to that effect, when viewed in contrast to the
passage of the Tenth Amendment and the recurring congressional prac-
tice of including the equal footing requirement in the admission legisla-
tion of all states since 1796, must have contributed to this confusion. In
addition, the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements on the is-
sue have not been consistently clear, a situation which led to the inter-
twining of the principle with the submerged lands issue during the 1940's
and 1950's.
Furthermore, the lack of an adequate historical perspective stemming
from an ignorance of the mechanics of the statehood process has inexora-
bly led to a somewhat nebulous description of the equal footing require-
ment, both in political and scholarly circles. When considering the nature
of this constitutional principle, most scholars have failed to acknowledge
the two-pronged vision of our particular concept of equality. Thus, most
people have been inclined to evaluate equality of States in absolute terms
without realizing a paradox unique to the American experience; although
the American people have shown a remarkable passion for social and po-
litical equality for each individual, they have also demonstrated an
187 363 U.S. at 127-28.
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equally strong desire for individualism, free entreprenurial activity, tech-
nological ingenuity, and an ever improving standard of living which inevi-
tably has resulted in economic inequality. The interaction between these
ideals and the libertarian principles embodied in the Federal Constitution
have often brought conflicting results and a necessity to choose between
the principles of liberty and equality. In this sense, the historical bifurca-
tion of equality, as a socio-political goal to be attained immediately and
as a long term economic ideal to be reached gradually as the Nation's
standard of living is improved, can be viewed as a legitimate and uniquely
American effort to reconcile the principles of liberty with the principles of
equality and justice for all. Traditionally, this phenomenon has reflected
itself in the statehood experience of each individual State and more spe-
cifically in the development of the Equal Footing Doctrine.
Having reviewed the applicable cases and supportive reasoning, the
following set of principles emerge as the basic components of the Equal
footing Doctrine. Equal footing is a constitutional principle which deals
with the political attributes of the individual States admitted to the
Union. It is rooted in the Tenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
and requires full equality in sovereignty and political power of each and
every member of the Union. Therefore, when a new State is admitted to
the Union, it enters with all the powers of sovereignty and political juris-
diction which pertained to the original and already established States.
Such power cannot be constitutionally diminished, impaired or taken
away by any conditions, compacts, irrevocable ordinances, clauses or stip-
ulations embraced in the congressional act under which the new States
enter the Union.188
The Equal Footing Doctrine works not only as a constitutional limi-
tation on the power of Congress to set terms for admission into the
Union, but also as an effective legal deterrent to the statehood leadership
of each aspiring State against any attempt to sell, give away or bargain
the inherent powers of the future member of the Union. Thus, the Equal
Footing Doctrine prevents the negotiation of the vital and essential at-
tributes of State sovereignty by the greed of state politicians who would
dare to accept humiliating conditions in exchange for prompt congres-
sional admission. Hence, the Federal Government cannot impose the site
of a State's capital city, 8' nor can it set restrictions upon the election of
local judges.19 Likewise, Congress could not create a State against the
will of its people, nor could it tamper with a State's educational system,
or its laws regulating estates and family relations. Furthermore, Congress
"8 Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
169 See notes 135-45 supra and accompanying text.
10 See notes 150-56 supra and accompanying text.
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cannot impose cultural patterns or a uniform language 91 on any State
entering the Union. Any congressional limitation concerning these sub-
jects would be constitutionally void since these areas, along with many
others, have been left to the State's jurisdiction by the Tenth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution.
Conversely, Congress can impose upon admission any terms and con-
ditions it may deem appropriate as long as they are framed within its
general constitutional authority and ,as long as they remain a legitimate
exercise of the power delegated to it by the Constitution. A distinction
between State and congressional powers may be clarified by the following
description:
To move Congressional discretion a state may agree to insert provisions
in its organic act which may or may not be binding after admission. Con-
ditions which the state may have to fulfill to get into the Union, but
which are thereafter subject to the state's discretion, belong in a different
category from those which are intended to be controlling on the state
after admission. The latter conditions are themselves divided into two
groups, the first being those within the conceded power of Congress in
the subject, the second those that are intended to restrict the state
within the sphere of state power. An act of admission is merely an act of
Congress. Congress has certain constitutional legislative powers. Congress
cannot enlarge these powers simply by including its enactment as a part
of the conditions of the admission of a state. If what Congress provided
as a condition for the admission of a state would stand until repealed as
independent legislation within the authority of Congress, it will be bind-
ing upon the state affected. If Congress does not have such power, the
condition is not binding upon the state. Speaking broadly, conditions
designed to restrict the states in the area alotted to the states exclusively
by the Constitution may be disregarded by the states after admission. 192
It follows then that any condition imposed upon admission is only a
congressional mandate the validity of which depends on the constitu-
tional authority to enforce it, regardless of the form required, i.e. enabling
act, admission act, irrevocable ordinance passed by the authorities of the
State, or a clause to be inserted in the constitution. Hence, Congress has
the power to impose restrictions dealing with the following State's power:
taxation of Federal lands,198 regulation of Indian affairs,194 impairment of
'9' N. JIMENEZ-VALAZQUEZ, CULTURAL IDENTITY AND PUERTO RICAN STATEHOOD: AN HIS-
TORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 1777 (1981) (unpublished manuscript on file at the
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law).
"' Hanna, Equal Footing in the Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519, 526
(1951).
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
"o Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 604 (1916), and United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S.
29 (1914).
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contractual obligations,'" guarantee of civil and religious liberties as pro-
tected by the Bill of Rights,' regulation of interstate commerce,'1 7 and
specific provisions requiring the new State constitution to be republican
in form.1"
The Equal Footing Doctrine permits neither an unequal application
of State sovereignty from one State to another, nor a haphazard en-
croachment by the Federal Government into the realm of issues deter-
mined by State sovereignty.1" Hence, a State cannot raise armies, wage
war, conduct foreign relations, issue currency, admit other States into the
Union, regulate interstate commerce or conduct any other business of
government exclusively reserved to one of the three branches of the Fed-
eral Government.200
Finally, the Equal Footing Doctrine deals primarily with political
rights and attributes of sovereignty. It does not include equality of States
in pure economic terms nor does it apply to land grants or the the eco-
nomic aid and concessions made to a State by Congress as part of its
terms of admission. In fact, a review of history clearly demonstrates that
at no time since the formation of the Union have all of the States exper-
ienced economic equality. In fact, many States entered the Union with
only incipient, undeveloped economies which were highly dependent upon
the Federal Government,20' while others entered with fairly strong and
independent economies.202 Legal scholars have commented on this histori-
cal economic reality in the following terms: "such equality referred in no
way to the size and resources of the States, since obviously no States had
natural equality in this respect."2 0 In addition, another legal commenta-
tor has stated that:
[E]qual footing referred primarily to political rights and sovereignty. It
could have no significance as to economic resources. Just as individuals
by the Declaration of Independence are regarded as free and equal with-
', Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1901).
o See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). But see Permoli v. New Orleans,
4 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1945).
107 Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1854).
1,8 See Park supra note 64 and Monnet, supra note 142.
1" United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
201 Naturally, we should recognize that there are certain areas where both Congress and
the States have power to act. The traditional constitutional Preemption Doctrine establishes
that in such a case, the State has authority to act until Congress pre-empts or occupies the
field and thereby displaces the power of the State to deal with the subject. See Florida Lime
and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); see also Spooner v. McConnell, 22
F. Cas. 939 (C.C.D. Ohio 1838).
2" Such was the case with Alaska, Florida, Indiana and the Southwestern States.
202 Hawaii and Texas constitute a case in point.
202 Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, The Constitution and the Continental Shelf, 26 TEx.
L. REV. 398, 426 (1948).
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out signifying that they are equal in personal qualities, so the political
party of the States does not prevent an immense diversity as to
property.20'
Throughout history Congress has recognized this fact by handling the ec-
onomic aid and concessions accorded each State on an individual, yet un-
equal, basis while according it the same political rights as the other mem-
bers of the Federation."'5
D. The Principle of a Permanent Union
Three constitutional restrictions which limit the power of Congress to
deal with new States have been presented: (1) a State cannot be carved
out of another State without permission of the mother State,2 " (2) a
State cannot be admitted to the Union without a guarantee of a republi-
can form of government,107 and (3) the existence of the Equal Footing
Doctrine.208 These tenents were founded in the Principle of Permanent
Union established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading case of
Texas v. White.2s 9 This fourth constitutional restriction, which exclu-
sively applies to States of the Union, postulates that American federalism
is composed of equal members sharing a common democratic experience
and politically united by an indissoluble bond in perpetuity.2 0 Thus, once
Congress admits a new State into the Union it cannot reverse, repeal,
revoke, suspend or annul its own act of admission. A State remains a per-
manent member of the Union unless all of the States, including the one
at issue, unanimously agree to dissolve it. Congress only has the power to
admit States; it lacks the constitutional authority to expel them from the
Federation. Immediately following the Civil War, the Supreme Court
made the following comments concerning the secession of the State of
Texas and the permanence of the Federation:
... Under the Constitution, though the powers of the States were
much restricted, still, all powers not delegated to the United States, nor
prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people .... Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and
204 See Hanna, supra note 192.
06 Recent political studies have erroneously suggested that equal footing is a "condi-
tion" imposed upon the admission of all states which prevents Congress from granting dif-
ferent economic concessions and terms of admission. This is one more anti-statehood myth
with which lacks any legal, constitutional or historical base. See Serrano-Geyls and Gorrin-
Peralta, supra note 86.
2" U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
207 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
s8 See e.g., Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
21" 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
'IQ Id. at 725.
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independent autonomy to the States through their union under the Con-
stitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of
the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much
within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the
Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitu-
tion, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible States.
Considered therefore as transactions under the Constitution, the or-
dinance of secession, adopted by the convention and ratified by a major-
ity of the citizens of Texas, and all the acts of her legislature intended to
give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null. They were utterly
without operation in law.
Our conclusion therefore is, that Texas continued to be a State, and
a State of the Union, notwithstanding the transactions to which we have
referred. And this conclusion, in our judgment, is not in conflict with any
act or declaration, of any department of the National government, but
entirely in accordance with the whole series of such acts and declarations
since the first outbreak of the rebellion 2 "
Statehood, however, is a perpetual commitment on the part of the
citizens of the new entity in which they pledge their allegiance to the
Federal Constitution; it binds them to obey the laws of the Nation, to
adhere strictly to a republican form of government, and to contribute to
the general well-being of the Nation in democratic, political, cultural,
socio-economic and moral terms. Hence, statehood, like independence,
constitutes the ultimate exercise of "self-determination" for a colonial
people because it consists of a definite political integration as an equal
member of the United States of America. In this sense the statehood ex-
perience contrasts sharply with that of territories, trusts, commonwealths
and similar non-self-governing entities which as non-permanent colonial
possessions have a nationally and internationally recognized right to self-
determination. Consequently, the notion of "permanent union" as a con-
cept inherent in any colonial relationship must be considered a contradic-
tion in terms.
V. THE RIGHT TO STATEHOOD
A. The Debate
During Hawaii and Alaska's battles for admission to the Union, two
of the most actively debated issues centered on whether the people in
those territories had an inherent right to statehood, and whether Con-
211 Id. at 725-26.
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gress could postpone indefinitely their admission even against the will of
the vast majority of the citizens living in those two areas. The debate over
these questions goes back to the early days of the Republic touching upon
the very essence of the American Federalist democracy. Traditionally,
two conflicting theories on the subject have prevailed: the Jeffersonian
viewpoint and the Hamiltonian or Imperialist perspective. Although both
theories depart from colonialism as a necessary foundation for American
development, they do so from widely different vantage points and for dis-
tinctly different reasons.2 1
The first of these theories originates in Thomas Jefferson's 1784
blueprint for a territorial system, which regards the territories as vast
areas of land to be settled by rugged individualists who would transform
them into autonomous politicical communities with an ingrained demo-
cratic tradition.2 1 3 Having achieved the adoption of the guidelines of
Jefferson's Ordinances of 1784214 and 1785216 (the first did not go into
effect although adopted by Congress) and the Ordinance of 178716 (which
was not introduced by Jefferson-he was serving abroad at the time), the
Jeffersonians viewed the territorial system as a scheme of colonization
that would operate temporarily in a given area only until it had reached a
minimum population and after its inhabitants had experienced a brief
tutelage in self-government. During this transitory status, Congress would
organize the government. Once the citizens of that area had learned the
ways of democracy, the territory would then be admitted as a full and
equal member of the Union. Hence, the advocates of this theory visual-
ized the territories as a national trust (rather than national domain) to
whose population, Congress had the obligation of granting self-govern-
ment or statehood as a matter of right. The readiness for the admission of
each territory into the Union would be evidenced by three factors: reach-
ing a minimum population; having attained experience in democracy; and
the desire for statehood.2 1 7 For these territories, the colonial system
served as a nursery for rearing future members of the Union and as an
expeditious means of expanding America's democratic ideals to the extent
that the nation's expanding boundaries permitted. Jeffersonian theory
vest in all the citizens of the growing Union the rights of self-government,
liberty, equality and the opportunity to contribute to the general welfare
212 H.N. SMITH, VIRGIN LAND 12 (1950).
"' Davila and Jimenez, The American Statehood Process and Its Relevance to Puerto
Rico's Colonial Reality, (April, 1980) (paper submitted to the Smithsonian Institution's
Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars Conference: The United States and Puerto Rico, to be
published in a collection of articles by Yale University Press).
214 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 12, at 121.
210 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 12, at 123.
216 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (1789).
217 Id.
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of the Federation.21
In sharp contrast, the second theory finds its roots in Alexander
Hamilton's uncompromising merchantilist vision of a powerful American
empire. The Hamiltonians saw the nation's territorial expansion as the
means for advancing American commercial interests and political influ-
ence on a worldwide basis, placing very little importance on the creation
and admission of new States. As a result, the advocates of Hamiltonian
expansionism stressed Congress' unlimited hegemony over the colonies,
which were considered more as national real estate than as developing
communities of citizens reared in the ways of democracy. Thus, Congress
had absolute power over these territories which were to be settled, ex-
ploited and used exclusively in the national interest. In the exercise of
that unlimited power, Congress could grant or indefinitely withhold the
degree of autonomy or self-government that it might deem appropriate as
an incident of the political organization.2 19
B. The Jeffersonian Tradition
Undoubtedly, the Jeffersonian view, with its recognition of the right
to self-government and statehood, prevailed with the adoption of the
Northwest Ordinances and throughout the nineteenth century.220 As pre-
viously mentioned, the Ordinance of 1787 provided the basic pattern for
the organization of all American territories into three stages of political
development, culminating in their admission as equal states of the Union
once they reached 60,000 free inhabitants and had framed a republican
constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States clearly adopted
this model when it held in the case of American Insurance Co. v.
Canter,21 that the power of the United States to acquire new territory is
derived by implication from the express power to admit new States from
the authority of the government to enter into treaties and to declare or
make peace.222
Ironically, the Supreme Court's clearest pronouncement on the tran-
sitory nature of American colonialism and of its inevitable denoue-
ment-the admission of new members to the Union-came in the igno-
minious case of Dred Scott v. Sanford,22 which excluded Black
Americans from the meaning of the term "citizen" and instead labeled
"18 Neil, The American Territorial System Since the Civil War: A Summary Analysis,
60 IND. MAGAZINE HIST. 219, 226 (1964); Alden, The Evolution of the American System of
Forming and Admitting New States into the Union, 18 ANNALS 469, 476 (1901).
119 H.N. SMITH, supra note 177; Neil, supra note 218.
220 See Patterson, supra note 85.
221 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
22 Id. at 542.
22 60 U.S. (19 How.) 383 (1857).
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them as simple "property. '2 4 Speaking for the Court on the limits con-
gressional power over its territories, Chief Justice Taney summarized the
Jeffersonian tradition in the following way:
There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal
Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United
States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure;, nor
to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by the admission of
new States. That power is plainly given; and if a new State is admitted it
needs no further legislation by Congress, because the Constitution itself
defines the relative rights and powers, and duties of the State, and the
citizens of the State, and the Federal Government. But no power is given
to acquire a Territory to be held and governed permanently in that
character.
... The power to expand the territory of the United States by the ad-
mission of new States is plainly given; and in the construction of this
power by all the departments of the Government, it has been held to
authorize the acquisition of territory, not fit for admission at the time,
but to be admitted as soon as its population and situation would entitle
it to admission. It is acquired to become a State, and not to be held as a
colony and governed by Congress with absolute authority.22 5
Still more perplexing is the fact that while the status of citizenship
was denied to a laage segment of the population, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized, for the first time in history, that citizenship is a source of rights
under the Federal Constitution.2 6 According to the Court's opinion, the
constitutional terms "people of the United States" and "citizens" are sy-
nonymous and represent a political community of persons with rights,
privileges, sovereignty and the power to conduct the government of the
Nation.2 7 Furthermore, the Court held that the Constitution and the
rights it accorded to its citizens extended to all of the territories under
congressional trust. 28 As a result, the rights of U.S. citizens residing in
any colonial possession were fully protected against any encroachment by
the Federal Government just as the rights of the citizens residing in any
of the States of the Union were protected against similar intrusions by
the federal authorities. '
Even though the Dred Scott case, like the Constitution, failed to de-
fine "citizenship" or to explain its specific content in terms of rights and
privileges, the Court clearly maintained that the citizens of the United
224 Id. at 404-05.
222 Id. at 446-47.
... See Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 369 (1973).
227 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404.
228 Id. at 448.
229 Id. at 449.
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States residing in a territory were on the same footing with the citizens of
the States230 as far as those rights were concerned. Unfortunately, this
important equalization of the rights of citizens living in the States with
those of the citizens living in the colonies was inevitably lost by the de-
grading and dehumanizing aspects of the opinion and its devastating ef-
fects upon the Black American's struggle for equality. It required; a Civil
War; the approval of the Thirteenth2 3 1 and Fourteenth Amendments; 232
the passage of multiple congressional Civil Rights Acts;233 100 years of
court litigation; 3" and an active equal rights movement to reverse and
erase the ominous legacy of the Dred Scott decision and of Jim Crow
legislation. Still, this opinion is relevant in so far as it reflects a liberal
historical attitude towards the territories, the American citizens residing
there, and their unremitting efforts to attain statehood.
During the last century the Jeffersonian viewpoint permeated not
only the contemporary legal thinking, but also the statehood process and
the congressional policy towards admission. Between the years of 1791
and 1890 a total of 31 states were admitted by Congress into the Union, 85
with an average experience of slightly less than 13 years under colonial
tutelage in their pre-admission history." Furthermore, our study reveals
that in the battle for admission of the States of Tennessee, Ohio, Louisi-
ana, 2 87 Missouri, Arkansas, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, California, Oregon,
110 Id. at 450-51.
131 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
'3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
238 E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. See U.S.C. § 241 et. seq. for current status of civil rights legislation
in the United States.
" See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and authorities collected in G.
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 754-88 (10th ed. 1980).
23 These were: Vermont (1791), Kentucky (1792), Tennessee (1796), Ohio (1803), Loui-
siana (1812), Indiana (1816), Mississippi (1817), Illinois (1818), Alabama (1819), Maine
(1820), Missouri (1821), Arkansas (1836), Michigan (1837), Florida (1845), Texas (1845),
Iowa (1846), Wisconsin (1848), California (1850), Minnesota (1858), Oregon (1859), Kansas
(1861), West Virginia (1863), Nevada (1864), Nebraska (1867), Colorado (1876), North Da-
kota (1889), South Dakota (1889), Montana (1889), Washington (1889), Idaho (1890), and
Wyoming (1890). See EXPERIENCES OF PAST TERRITORIES, supra note 54, at 8.
23 The following States experienced the so-called "tutelage in democracy" as organized
Territories (number of years in parentheses): Washington (36), Michigan (32), North Da-
kota (28), South Dakota (28), Idaho (27), Montana (25), Florida (23), Wyoming (22), Missis-
sippi (19), Arkansas (17), Indiana (16), Ohio (16), Colorado (15), Nebraska (13), Wisconsin
(12), Oregon (11), Missouri (9), Illinois (9), Minnesota (9), Iowa (8), Louisiana (8), Kansas
(7), Tennessee (6), Nevada (3), and Alabama (2). See EXPERIENCES OF PAST TERRITORIES,
supra note 54, at 8.
The States of Vermont, Kentucky, Maine and West Virginia were formed from already
existing States while the States of California and Texas were acquired from foreign govern-
ments just prior to their admission and consequently escaped territorial organization.
"' The people of Louisiana based their demands for admission upon Article III of the
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Kansas, Nevada and the Dakotas, the citizens of those areas successfully
demanded admission as a right granted to them by the provisions of the
Northwest Ordinance or as a right inherent in their national citizenship
along with the privileges and immunites consistent with such status. 38
C. The Three Jeffersonian Guidelines for Statehood
Meanwhile, as the statehood process evolved, Congress began to con-
sider three fundamental guidelines for the admission of an aspiring politi-
cal entity into the Union. First, in order to consider statehood for any
given area, Congress required that a majority of eligible voters living in
the proposed new State earnestly desire statehood.2 3 ' This specific guide-
line was parallel to the principles of the consent of the governed and self-
determination inherent in the statehood process itself. Usually, in most of
the aspiring states, the formal movement towards admission was initiated
by the presentation to Congress of various testamonials demanding ad-
mission as a matter of right. These petitions generally originated in a
statehood referendum where a majority of the voters favored admission,
in legislative resolutions sent to Congress by the popularly elected territo-
rial assemblies, in citizens' conventions, or in a special mandate received
by the territorial delegates and governors who served as conduits from
the people to offer the petition to that national body.
A second traditional guideline for admission has stressed that the cit-
izens of the aspiring State be inbued with and devoted to the principles
of democracy and self-government as exemplified by the American form
of government and the Federal Constitution. 40 The inhabitants of the
future state must have demonstrated a common democratic heritage,
however limited by colonialism itself, and must have adopted American
principles, traditions, aspirations and institutions of democratic govern-
ment. This specific principle reflected the Jeffersonian objective of Amer-
ican territorialism and its justification for a transitory tutelage in democ-
Cession Treaty of 1803, which stated: "The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be in-
corporated into the Union ... and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles
of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all rights, advantages and immunities of
American citizens of the United States .... " Cession Treaty of 1803, United States-
France, art. III, 8 Stat. 200, T.S. No. 86 (emphasis added). This is probably the first con-
gressional recognition, by way of treaty, of American citizenship as the source for a right to
statehood. This claim is important for three basic reasons: 1) Louisiana was the first non-
contiguous territory to enter the Union; 2) it was ceded by treaty; and 3) it had a different
culture.
28 Davila and Jimenez, supra note 213.
230 G. CURTIS, ADMISSION OF UTAH: LIMITATION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY BY COMPACT WITH
THE UNITED STATES 9 (1887); Huddle, Admission of New States, 1 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP.
185, 190 (1946).
240 E. Joy, supra note 22, at 43.
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racy. Of course, this guideline was somewhat ignored with the admission
of California, a political entity never formally organized by Congress
before its admission, and the admission of Alabama, Nevada, Tennessee,
Kansas, along with a few other States which experienced brief periods of
territoriality.2 41 Therefore, democratic heritage and loyalty to America's
institutions were not exclusively measured by the specific period of bond-
age, but also by the particular circumstances surrounding each commu-
nity's development, by their intense desire for self-government as exem-
plified by specific actions directed toward their quest for statehood and
by their previous contribution to the Nation's prosperity.
The final historical guideline for admission stressed that the pro-
posed new state have sufficient population and resources to support a
state government. The criteria for population follows the Northwest Or-
dinance of 1787, which established the standard of 60,000 freemen as an
adequate requirement to claim admission as a matter of right.2"" No legal
or historical limitation has ever been established as to the maximum
number of inhabitants any given area might have in order to qualify for
statehood. The resources which were thought to be necessary to sustain a
State government included: human, natural, individual, commercial and
agricultural elements that would contribute to the efficient operation of
organized life in each particular political community. The standard size of
population and quantity of resources never meant a particular degree of
wealth nor a minimum monetary contribution to the Federal treasury.
Instead, the concept of wealth as an indispensable condition for admis-
sion was specifically rejected by the Framers of the Constitution as being
undemocratic, elitist and contrary to the postulates of the American
Revolution.2 48 Thus, membership in the nation was to be open to wealthy,
middle class and underprivileged communities alike, irrespective of their
capacity to contribute to the national treasury. Such was the case because
the Founding Fathers saw statehood as an issue of political equality and
self-determination which could not be measured in strictly monetary
terms.
Furthermore, the statehood experience itself proves that there has
never been equality among the states in economic stature, degree of eco-
nomic self-reliance, ownership of land, natural resources, population and
general economic development, or even their monetary contribution to
241 See note 236 supra for a list of states which experienced a "tutelage in democracy."
142 Before 1787, the Northwest Ordinance of 1784 provided: "whensoever any of the
said states shall have, of free inhabitants, as many as shall then be in any one the least
numerous of the thirteen Original States, such state shall be admitted by its delegates into
the Congress of the United States on an equal footing with the said original states .. .
See 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 12, at 122.
22 1 Farrand, supra note 20, at 605-06.
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the Federal Government. Hence, there has been great diversity among the
states as far as their relative wealth is concerned. More importantly, at
the time of admission most territories had fairly underdeveloped econo-
mies when compared to the older and more progressive states. 4" As a
result, in the vast majority of the cases, statehood opposition at a local or
national level was based upon the "negative" and "disastrous" impact
that statehood would have upon the "fragile" colonial economies and spe-
cifically upon the capacity to sustain an efficient State government.
Following this line of reasoning, a few typical "doomsday" predic-
tions emerged against the admission of many states: additional expenses
and taxes would bring the economic collapse of the new state; 4 5 the state
could not sustain itself for lack of natural resources; 46 the aspiring terri-
tory did not qualify for admission because of its underdeveloped econ-
omy; 4 7 widespread poverty in the territory impeded its admission;248 and,
finally statehood would be too costly for American taxpayers because as a
territory the area's costs were defrayed largely by Federal funds. 49
In recent years, the criteria used to determine the state's necessary
"wealth" and "economic capacity to pay its proportionate share to help
sustain the cost of the Federal Government" have been incorrectly cited
by certain congressional documents and studies as "traditional" or "his-
toric" requirements for admission.8 0 This so called "traditional require-
ment" dates back to Article IV of the Ordinance of 1787 which stated in
part:
The inhabitants and settlers in the said territory shall be subject to pay a
part of the Federal debts, contracted or to be contracted, and a propor-
tional part of the expenses of government to be apportioned on them by
Congress, according to the same common rule and measure by which ap-
portionments thereof shall be made on the other States.815
244 Davila and Jimenez, supra note 213.
245 This argument was raised in the statehood battles of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wiscon-
sin, Iowa, Oregon, Nevada, Nebraska, Montana, Washington, the Dekotas, New Mexico,
Alaska and Hawaii.
246 This was asserted in the statehood struggles of Maine, Florida, New Mexico and
Arizona.
.47 Critics raised this argument against Arkansas, Michigan, Florida, New Mexico,
Arizona, Alabama and Alaska.
148 This was argued against Florida and Michigan.
249 This was asserted against Alaska.
15See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1929, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1949); Tansill, Statehood for Ha-
waii and Alaska (1954) (Legislative Reference Service Report); Sheridan, Policy Issues in
The Admission of Certain States into the Union: A Brief Analysis (March 31, 1978) (Con-
gressional Research Service Report); and more recently, ExPERIENCEs OF PAST TERRITORIES,
supra note 54.
251 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, reprinted in 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a.) (1789). This wording
could have inspired a dictum found 114 years later in the infamous case of Downes v. Bid-
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However, in spite of its ancient statutory origin, this specific clause
or similar wording stressing a minimum contribution to the Federal Gov-
ernment has never been required of any state upon its admission to the
Union. Research has failed to produce a single instance or congressional
debate in which this additional economic "criteria" was raised or required
in the statehood process of any aspiring entity. On the other hand, many
debates over statehood concerned a territory's economic capability to sus-
tain an efficient and operational State government.
Inquiries as to whether a state has sufficient population and re-
sources were never directed towards its capacity to pay a share of the cost
of the Federal Government nor did they indicate a particular degree of
wealth or a required minimum contribution to the Federal Treasury.
Consequently, it is inaccurate and misleading to refer to this criteria as a
"historic" or "traditional" requirement since it was never "required" as
such.2 5 Ironically, the reverse has been the norm because financial mat-
ters and the pressing needs of most aspiring states have been considered
by Congress, not to deny admission, but rather to determine the need for
traditional economic measures to bolster their social development at a
pace comparable to that of the other states."' It should be reiterated,
again, that there are no historic, constitutional or traditional factors to
well, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), where the Supreme Court of the United States, in an effort to
judicially curtail any possible and future aspirations to statehood by the citizens of the
newly acquired, impoverished Spanish possessions (Puerto Rico, The Philippines and
Guam), makes reference to the United States as a geographical unit, composed of States,
and continguous territories populated by "all the native white inhabitants being endowed
with citizenship, protected by pledges of a common union .'. . all being under the obligation
to contribute their proportionate share for the liquidation of the debt and future expenses
of the general government." Id. at 319 (White, J., concurring). Many years later during
Alaska's battle for statehood this burdensome obligation was reproduced in various docu-
ments and publications of Congress as a generally recognized "traditional requirement for
statehood." See authorities cited in note 250 supra.
... If applied in the future to new petitions for admission, this burdensome and histori-
cally unsound criteria would provide ammunition for the opponents of statehood for the
present territories and it would constitute a basis for future congressional discrimination
against poor and underprivileged peoples who aspire to statehood as the only dignified alter-
native to colonialism within the present American constitutional framework. But see U.S.
Dep't of the Interior, Interagency Territorial Policy Review Task Force Report 8 (Sept.
1979).
Even if judged by the strict standard of financial capability, Puerto Rico, when com-
pared to the economies of the present 50 States (which have enjoyed the full economic bene-
fits of statehood for at least 20 years), would still have the population and resources to
contribute its fair share not only to the economic well-being of the Nation, but also to the
national defense. Furthermore, one could reasonably argue that the Island's present dis-
tressed economic situation is a direct consequence of its inherent colonial status, proving
once more that such an arrangement does not serve the best interests of the citizens of
Puerto Rico or their counterparts on the mainland.
I' See EXPERIENCES OF PAST TERRITORIES, supra note 54.
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support the validity of this so called economic "requirement."
To place these traditional guidelines in perspective, it should be
noted that they developed informally during the first 100 years of the'
statehood experience, as part of the Jeffersonian tradition to expedite the
admission of new member states into the Union. Thus, the three stan-
dards are based strictly on custom and upon the spirit of the Ordinance
of 1787, not upon legal or constitutional criteria to be followed to the
letter. Furthermore, the specific experiences shows that all three guide-
lines have been applied in a liberal and flexible manner. At times, Con-
gress may have totally disregarded these standards when the dictates of
policy, expedience, political necessity and equality before the law so re-
quired 2 ' Consequently, Ohio, Illinois, Florida, Nebraska and Nevada
were admitted into the Union with populations of less than the desired
minimum of 60,000 inhabitants and with some States having dubious eco-
nomic potential. 5 Similarly, and in total disregard of the second tradi-
tional requirement, Kansas was admitted amidst widespread violence and
bloodshed over the slavery controversy; California was admitted with no
previous territorial titelage; West Virginia entered the Union in spite of
the dubious constitutionality of its separation from her mother State;
Michigan and Idaho were admitted admist claims of serious irregularities
in their respective constitutional conventions. Likewise, the first require-
ment that the population demonstrate a great interest in statehood was
blatantly ignored when the States of Vermont, Kentucky, Ohio, Louisi-
ana, Alabama and Missouri were admitted without the benefit of a single
statehood referendum, public opinion poll or constitutional ratification
process that would tend to show widespread popular support for admis-
sion.250 Moreover, the State of Nebraska was admitted after the minimum
majority of voters (51%) had ratified the proposed State constitution. In
fact, the results of the only statehood referendum, held six years before,
showed that a 53% majority opposed admission.25
D. The Legacy of Imperialism: The Hamiltonian Vision
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, as the United States be-
gan its overseas expansionist adventures, the predominantly Jeffersonian
territorial policy was abandoned in favor of the Hamiltonian vision of a
permanent American colonial empire.' This shift in policy produced a
I" See EXPERIENCES OF PAST TERRITORIES, supra note 54.
'55 See EXPERIENCES OF PAST TERRITORIES, supra note 54.
'56 Davila and Jimenez, supra note 213.
257 See Davila and Jimenez, supra note 213.
288 The age of American imperialism began around this time with the Spanish-Ameri-
can War of 1898 (which brought the Phillippine Islands, Guam and Puerto Rico under
American hegemony), the annexation of Hawaii, the imposition in 1901 of the nefarious
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radical departure from the original design of transient colonialism geared
towards the admission of states to an essentially imperialist scheme based
on the then existing European model of permanent colonial administra-
tion for the economic benefit of the metropolis. Imperialist or
Hamiltonian thought, with its basic denial of the right to statehood,'9
has been described in the following terms:
The counterarguments of the Imperialists were presented energetically
and skillfully. Their basic assumption countered the views of Chief Jus-
tice Taney with those of Chief Justice John Marshall on the question of
territorial expansion. Marshall had stated that the United States might
acquire such territory as it saw fit. The imperialists insisted that this
power to acquire obviously implied the power to govern and that in the
case of the territories the power to govern was given solely to Congress.
This view, which they pointed out went back as far as the debates over
the Louisiana Purchase, had been in the long run overwhelmingly sus-
tained by the consistent opinions of the Supreme Court.
Even those who held to the view that territories are automatically em-
bryo states admitted that while Congress could not create the popula-
tion, resources, and institutions necessary to the development of a state,
the timing and manner of admission were political questions only Con-
gress could determine. The right to become a state, the Imperialists ar-
gued, was not inherent in a community; organic and enabling laws were
'powerful creative acts of Congress, not mere formalities' following asser-
tion by a territory of the right to statehood. The exigencies of the situa-
tion fully accounted for those instances where a territory anticipated the
action of Congress and seemingly asserted a prior right. However, only a
popular assumption, substantiated by the lax and informal procedures as
well as by the precedent of the large number of territories becoming
states, gave the semblance of verity to a right that actually did not exist
as as such. According to this argument, enough historical evidence was
available in an examination of the terms which Congress had laid down
as conditions of entry to justify the assertion that the right to admit
states was the exclusive prerogative of the Federal Government acting
through Congress.'6
Platt Amendment upon the Sovereignty of Cuba, the implementation of the China "Open
Door" policy, Rooseveltian "gunboat" and "Big Stick" diplomacy in the Caribbean, the ac-
quisition of the Panama Canal enclave in 1903 and the development of an imperial navy
following Alfred Mahan's blueprint. For a comprehensive analysis of America's imperial ex-
periment, see J. PRATT, AMEICAN'S COLONIAL EXPERIMENT (1950).
151 E. Joy, supra note 22; see also Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions, 13
HARV. L. REV. 155 (1899); Coudert, Our New Peoples: Citizens, Subjects, Nationals, or
Aliens, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 13 (1903).
200 Neil, supra note 218.
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The U.S. Supreme Court would not explicitly recognize the political
attitudes contained in its decisions. The result was "judicial legisla-
tion 26 1 commonly referred to as the Insular Cases.262 In essence, these
cases delineated the differences between "incorporated" and "non-incor-
porated" territories. Incorporated territories were areas with an inherent
right to statehood in which the Federal Constitution is applied in its en-
tirety as a restriction on Congressional powers over the territories,'
Nonincorporated territories were merely geographical possessions inhab-
ited by "alien people" where only certain "natural" or "fundamental"
constitutional provisions applied, giving Congress greater flexibility to
legislate either in favor of or against the residents of these unincorporated
areas.21 Moreover, in tracing a distinction between the incorporated and
nonincorporated territories, Justice White in Downes v. Bidwell stated
that the areas encompassed by Northwest Ordinances belonged to the
former category as integral parts of the United States, populated by "na-
tive white inhabitants" who as citizens of the Federation were endowed
with the rights and privileges of their citizenship and with an ultimate
promise of statehood.2" Five elements emerged in Justice White's opinon
which distinguished the citizens of the previously incorporated territories
from the inhabitants of the unincorporated overseas possessions: (1) their
origin and color (native white vis-a-vis aliens of hispanic or oriental de-
scent); (2) the contiguity of the mainland territory (locality); (3) their
personal status (citizens vis-A-vis non-citizens); (4) their capacity to con-
tribute to the Federal Government (tax paying vis-A-vis tax exempted re-
sidents); and (5) their ultimate destiny as a political community (the for-
mer having a right to statehood, the latter being subject to the will and
whim of Congress).26 6 In addition, the overt racial undertones and the
,' See opinion of Justice Brown in De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901). Brown, al-
though a staunch supporter of the imperalist view, stated that to hold that Congress could
indefinitely maintain a territory in a state of colonial bondage would have been tantamount
to "pure judicial legislation." Id. at 198. Ironically, this is precisely what the Insular Cases
did.
22 De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Pepke v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); GonzAlez v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904); Dorr v.
United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Kopel
v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909); and most recently see Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651
(1980).
20 See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279-83.
264 Id.
2 5 Id. at 319 (White, J., concurring).
2" Ironically, Hawaii and Alaska, two overseas territories, were found subsequently to
be incorporated entities, while Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam were deemed not to
have been "integral parts" of the United States. Thus, in time, the validity of these five
characteristics became highly questionable in view of Hawaii's noncontiguity and its
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strong emphasis on the criteria of locality clearly indicated that the new
colonies and their native inhabitants were merely national real estate sub-
ject to a congressional determination. Although slavery and inequality vi-
olated American principles, these beliefs did not appear to withstand the
territorial expansion of the United States which paralleled Europe in its
imperialism.117
Beyond these judicial pronouncements, the annexation of overseas
colonies inhabited by non-Anglo and nonassimilated peoples presented a
fundamental dilemma in the political area which would haunt American
policymakers for the next eight decades. The crux of the issue focused on
whether the United States would remain an imperial power or whether it
would live up to its principles and rhetoric of equality for all of its peo-
ples including those persons living in the nonincorporated dependencies.
A prominent scholar has described this American predicament in the fol-
lowing terms:
The expansion of American power and influence precipitated a great na-
tional debate on imperialism, a debate that moved the nation for several
years before and after the Spanish-American War and dominated the
presidential election campaign of 1900. The electoral victory of President
William McKinley settled the controversy in favor of imperial expansion,
but the issue that remained was whether racially and culturally distinct
peoples brought under American sovereignty without the promise of citi-
zenship or statehood could be held indefinitely without doing violence to
American values-that is, whether certain peoples could be permanently
excluded from the American political community and deprived of equal
rights.26"
Congressional response towards the territories during the next two
decades followed an ambivalent route between the incorporated and
nonincorporated territories as a result of the Insular Cases. Thus, the
incorporated mainland Territories of New Mexico and Arizona were ad-
mitted into the Union while, at the same time, the nonincorporated and
loosely organized Indian territory was joined and admitted with the incor-
porated Territory of Oklahoma as a sovereign unitary State. Furthermore,
after both colonies had been formally organized, the Phillippines and
Puerto Rico were directed in politically opposite directions: the Jones Act
of 1916 pledged eventual independence to the Filipinos;' " however, the
Jones Act of 1917270 conferred American citizenship on all of the re-
predominantly oriental population, composed mainly of tax-paying American citizens.
2M7 Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 492
(1978).
268 Id. at 395.
28 Jones Act (Philippine Islands), ch. 416, 39 Stat. 545 (1916).
270 Jones Act (Puerto Rico), ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
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sidents of Puerto Rico "as a token of the permanence of the island's polit-
ical relationship to the United States". 1
Scarcely four months after the Jones Act of 1917 became effective,
the issue of whether or not the United States citizenship conferred upon
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico automatically converted the island into an
incorporated Territory was brought before the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico in the case of Muratti v. Foote.2 2 In that case, the court held that
Puerto Rico had been incorporated by the Jones Act as an organized
community of American citizens possessing all of the rights and immuni-
ties of that citizenship. 7 3 On review, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed the judgment rendered by Puerto Rico's high court with-
out expressing a single argument in rebuttal. 7 4
Four years later, in Balzac v. People of Puerto Rico,217 the Supreme
Court of the United States addressed the issues of citizenship and incor-
poration squarely, by holding that the Jones Act of 1917 did not incorpo-
rate the island into the Union.2 7 6 Furthermore, in assessing the meaning
of the newly acquired citizenship, the Court restricted its constitutional
content in so far as the unincorporated territories were concerned . 2 7
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court legitimzed a second class citizenship which
was morally equivalent to the racist "separate but equal" doctrine con-
secrated by that same Court 24 years earlier in the nefarious case of
Plessy v. Ferguson.2 78 The main thrust of the Balzac Court's argument
was:
[The Jones Act of 1917] enabled the [Puerto Ricans] to move into the
continental United States and [become] residents of any State there to
enjoy every right of any other citizen of the United States, civil, social
and political. A citizen of the Phillippines must be naturalized before he
can settle and vote in this country ... Not so the Porto Rican under the
Organic Act of 1917.
In Porto Rico, however, the Porto Rican can not insist upon, the
right of trial by jury, except as his own representative in his legislature
shall confer it on him. The citizen of the United States living in Porto
Rico can not there enjoy a right of trial by jury under the Federal Consti-
tution, any more than the Porto Rican. It is locality that is determinative
of the application of the Constitution, in such matters as judicial proce-
27 Cabranes, supra note 267, at 403, 406.
272 25 P.R.R. 527 (1917).
278 Id. at 537-38.
274 People of Puerto Rico v. Carlos Tapja, 245 U.S. 639 (1918), rev'g Muratti v. Foote,
25 P.R.R. 527 (1917).
278 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
276 Id. at 306.
277 Id. at 308-09.
2.7 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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dure, and not the status of the people who live in it.27 9
According to the Court, the residents of Puerto Rico along with those
of other colonies could enjoy the full protection of the Federal Constitu-
tion and all of the privileges and immunities of citizenship only if they
permanently moved to the continental United States. 80 In the meantime,
as residents of an overseas possession they could only claim their "funda-
mental" rights and a right to move to the mainland.2 ' Thus, the essential
link that binds the American citizens of the unincorporated colonies to
the national community and government had been serverely curtailed by
political expediency, the weak excuse of locality, and last but not least by
a strong ethnic and racial prejudice which permeated each of these opin-
ions. In this sense, the Insular Cases and Balzac have been described as
"the constitutional high-water mark for American imperialism"' 2 based
upon an "incoherent logic of imperialism rather than the logic of law.''
Still more relevant to our thesis, these cases constituted a rejection of the
right to statehood principle and an attempt to permanently exclude
United States citizens in unincorporated colonies from directly partici-
pating in the American political community and the enjoyment of the full
equal protection of the laws.'8 4
For the next five decades, the Imperialist viewpoint, the Insular
Cases and "benign neglect" dominated Federal policymaking towards the
unincorporated possessions. Meanwhile, during the 1940's and 1950's
Alaska and Hawaii, two incorporated areas, had intensified their long
struggle for statehood. Each demanded admission as a matter of right but
each based its claim on different constitutional sources.
Alaskans demanded statehood primarily as a right inherent in their
American citizenship which had been conferred on them in 1867 through
the Treaty of Cession with Russia. 85 National citizenship, they argued,
2 9 258 U.s. at 308-09.
111 Id. at 309.
281 Id. at 311.
"' Neil, supra note 218, at 229.
"' Womuth, The Constitution and the Territories, 29 CURRENT HIST. 337, 339 (1955).
284 Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Balzac illustrates this point:
We need not dwell on another consideration which requires us not lightly to
infer, from acts thus easily explained on other grounds, an intention to incorpo-
rate in the Union these distance ocean communities of a different origin and lan-
guage from those of our continental people. Incorporation has always been a step,
and an important one, leading to statehood. Without, in the slightest degree, inti-
mating an opinion as to the wisdom of such a policy, for that is not our province,
it is reasonable to assume that when such a step is taken, it will be begun and
taken by Congress deliberately and with a clear declaration of purpose, and not
left a matter of, mere inference or construction.
258 U.S. at 311.
Treaty of Cession of Alaska, Mar. 30, 1867, United States-Russia, 15 Stat. 539, T.S.
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embodied rights of full political participation, self-determination, equal
treatment under the laws and the dignity of belonging as an equal mem-
ber of the national community. Likewise, they claimed that citizenship
gave them the right to create the "State" of Alaska because the ultimate
sovereignty resided not in Congress, but in their collective will as mem-
bers of an organized political entity. Consequently, Alaskans proceeded to
implement a "Tennessee Plan" strategy which bore the fruit of their ad-
mission less than three years after it was first initiated .2
6
Hawaii demanded admission primarily as a right inherent in its polit-
ical status as an incorporated territory which had been reared in the ways
of democracy with a pledge of ultimate statehood. Hawaiians failed to
implement a Tennessee Plan strategy; thus, their admission as a State
came nine years after they had approved their state constitution.2 0 In
spite of their claimed right to statehood, the admission of both States was
delayed by at least 12 years in Congress as a result of the dictates of
partisan politics, the outbreak of the Korean War, a national conservative
mood and a prevailing insensitivity on the part of the policymakers to the
needs and aspirations of the citizens living in these two Territories. Ironi-
cally, the legacy of colonial realpolitik had even affected the people of the
last two incorporated Territories in their long struggle towards equality.
E. The Principle of Equal Citizenship: Towards a New Future
The continuing validity of the Imperialist viewpoint and the legacy
of discrimination left by the Insular Cases was challenged during the dec-
ades of the sixties and seventies by international and domestic events.2s s
The history of the last 20 years left permanent and significant changes in
America's socio-political fabric which discredited the fundamental prem-
ises upon which these postures were predicated. The premises at issue
were primarily: American hegemony in world affairs, colonialism and ter-
ritoriality, second class citizenship, the ethnocentric melting pot syn-
drome, the dominance in Federal politics by the northeastern (WASP)
establishment, and the belief that internal autonomy alone could solve
the problems of the overseas territories.
Consequently, on the international front, some of these premises
were left inoperative by such developments as: the debacle of the tradi-
tional American foreign policy tenets in Vietnam and Iran; the dilution of
United States power and influence on a worldwide basis; the proliferation
of third world republics mostly hostile to American thought and interest;
No. 301.
"I' See generally, 1 Swindler, supra note 150, at 161-62, 208.
187 See generally, 3 Swindler, supra note 150, at 120.
88 Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980).
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the irreversible tide towards decolonization and, finally, Jimmy Carter's
human rights policy. Similarly, on the domestic front, the underlying
premises of discrimination and colonialism were finally voided by slow
but drastic changes in America's socio-political texture as exemplified by:
the emergence of a powerful, effective and influential black civil rights
movement; the end of the WASP monopoly over national politics and the
resurgence of the Republican Party; the acceptance of ethnicity, bilin-
gualism along with racial and cultural plurality; the women's liberation
movement; the demise of the Imperial presidency; the renaissance of the
sun-belt States; the end of unlimited affluence; the emergence of new
groups clamoring for recognition, equality and participation in national
politics; the collapse of "commonwealth status" in Puerto Rico as the
American showcase of economic and social prosperity in Latin America;
and finally, the development of an equal citizenship principle with a sub-
stantive content predicated upon the letter and spirit of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. It is precisely toward this last
development and its relevance to the continuing evolution of the right to
statehood that we shall direct our attention.
The meaning of the concept of "citizen" varies according to the con-
stitutional or historical framework of each country within the world com-
munity. According to the precepts of international law, "the citizen or
subject body of a State . . . constitutes one homogeneous body, all the
members of which have the same status, the same rights and duties." '
The Constitution of the United States as originally adopted uses the word
"citizen" several times throughout its text, yet it lacks a specific defini-
tion of this concept. 90 It was not until 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was duly adopted and ratified, that the Nation's primary law
impressed a meaning upon the term "citizenship."
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution expresses in the rel-
evant part that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and to
the State wherein they reside. '291 The Amendment further contemplates
that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
299 1 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 335 (2d ed.
1929).
290 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST, art. I, § 3, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1,
cl. 4.
291 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This includes those persons born in Puerto Rico, the
U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Canal Zone, who become American citizens through the
authority of congressional statutes. See 3 AM. JuR. 2d Aliens and Citizens § 116 (1962).
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nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." 2
As previously stated, the first attempt to define national citizenship
as a source of rights was made in the Dred Scott case. 93 In that case,
Chief Justice Taney's opinion equated the terms "people of the United
States" and "citizens" as a single community of persons entitled to equal
rights, privileges, and immunities2 9 4 This constitutional expansion of citi-
zenship was adopted by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,"' which
provided that "All persons born in the United States and not subject to
any foreign power . . . are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory in the United States. ."'" Although
its adoption was a direct aftermath of the constitutional abolition of slav-
ery in 1865,"' its use of the terms "every race and color" and "in every
State and Territory" substantiates the position that it covers a much
wider amalgam of subjects irrespective of locality. The Fourteenth
Amendment expanded its coverage in a manner that "went well beyond
prohibiting racial discrimination."'298 However, the legacy of the Insular
Cases had demonstrated that its full constitutional context has not been
extended to the American citizens residing in the present day United
States colonies which still remain in a state of political limbo. In spite of
this unfortunate situation, the scope and content of national citizenship
as a constitutional source of rights has been slowly expanded by the legal
thinking of the last three decades. Consequently, in view of these historic
and legal developments the principle of equal citizenship, as a constitu-
tional source of rights, assumes special relevance in relation to the un-
franchised second class citizens of these colonies. First, it serves as an
expeditious means of overcoming the unwarranted legacy of colonialism.
29' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
191 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
"' Id. at 404.
,, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). This was "the first authoritative definition of citizenship in
American Law." Bickel, supra note 226, at 372.
1" 14 Stat. 27, § 1. Professor Bickel argues:
The Dred Scott decision itself gave no definition of citizenship, or of its rights and
privileges. It invested the concept with no affirmative meaning. It used the idea
negatively, in exclusionary fashion, to indicate who was not under the umbrella of
rights and privileges and status, and thus to entrench the subjection of the Negro
in the Constitution.
Bickel, supra note 226, at 373. While this interpretation is fairly accurate, Professor Bickel
failed to realize the equalization of citizenship as it concerned the citizens living in the
Territories and their counterparts in the States.
207 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
S Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977).
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Second, it provides the substantive foundation for new and future claims
to statehood as a right inherent in the principles embodied in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
In his brilliant analysis of contemporary legal developments under
the Fourteenth Amendment, Professor Kenneth L. Karst has cogently ar-
gued that the guiding principle behind the relevant clauses of that consti-
tutional change lies not in equality as an abstraction but in the principle
of equal citizenship which safeguards each American's right to be treated
by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating
member of the national community.2 Furthermore, Professor Karst con-
tends that the essence of equal citizenship stems from the dignity of full
membership in the society. "Thus the principle not only demands a mea-
sure of equality of legal status, but also promotes a greater equality of the
other kind of status which is a social fact, namely one's rank on a scale
defined by degrees of deference or regard."300 Therefore, in order to
achieve full equality for all members of the American society, the follow-
ing indispensable values must be pursued: the elimination of castes and
demeaning stigmas; full participation in the Nation's decisionmaking
processes; and the opportunity to contribute to the well-being of the soci-
ety as a needed, productive, and responsible member. 01
299 Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
301 Professor Karst explains the content of these values as follows:
The principle of equal citizenship presumptively insists that the organ-
ized society treat each individual as a person, one who is worthy of respect,
one who 'belongs'.
Stated negatively, the principle presumptively forbids the organized so-
ciety to treat an individual either as amember of an inferior or dependent
caste or as a non-participant. Accordingly, the principle guards against deg-
radation or the imposition of stigma. The inverse relationship between
stigma and recognition as a person is evident. 'By definition,. . . we believe
that the person with a stigma is not quite human.' The relationship be-
tween stigma and inequality is also clear: while not all inequalities stigma-
tize, the essence of any stigma lies in the fact that the affected individual is
regarded as an unequal in some respect. A society devoted to the idea of
equal citizenship, then, will repudiate those inequalities that impose the
stigma of caste and thus 'belie the principle that people are of equal ulti-
.mate worth'.
In its most typical application, the principle of equal citizenship will
operate to prohibit the society from inflicting a 'status-harm' on members
of a group because of their group membership. But even in these applica-
tions, the main energies released by the equal citizenship principle are indi-
vidualistic. When one is freed from stigma, her sense of individual identity
is strengthened precisely because she is no longer defined by others in
terms of the stigma: she is regarded as a full human being, worthy of re-
spect and dignity, rather than merely as a specimen of the stigmatized
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Following these postulates, we place ourselves beyond the colonialist
category.
While respect for each individual's basic humanity is the primary value
in the principle of equal citizenship, the principle also encompasses two re-
lated and overlapping values: participation and responsibility. A citizen is a
participant, a member of a moral community who counts for something in
the community's decision-making processes. No less importantly a citizen is
a responsible member of the society, one who owes obligations to his fellow
members. Both these values contribute to self-respect, but they also have
independent significance.
The earliest writings in the Western political tradition define citizen-
ship as a right to participate in the society's formal processes of decision.
Aristotle, who more than anyone else set the terms of our discussion of such
matters, said that a citzien is one 'who has the power to take part in the
deliberative or judicial administration of any state. . . .' But citizenship
takes on a broader meaning when we enlarge our vision of society and com-
munity beyond the political arena. Once we recognize that citizenship is
more than the 'simple idea' of legal status, the value of participation can be
seen to embrace a fuller range of sharing the public life of the society.
Equal citizenship, by offering the opportunity of full participation in
the society, fosters the sense of community that is indispensable to one's
sense of individuality. At the same time, the opportunity to participate pro-
motes the 'sense of wholeness' function. The principle of equal citizenship,
nourished to fruition, offers all of the opportunity to belong to a national
community while continuing to identify ourselves with smaller groupings of
diverse and even conflicting values. Equal citizenship, then, is one institu-
tional response to the tension between autonomy and community.
To be a citizen is not merely to be a consumer of rights, but to be
responsible to other members of the community. Indeed, the definition (by
law and otherwise) of members' responsibilities to each other is one of the
chief indicia that a community exists. Among the responsibilities of citizen-
ship, of course, is the duty to obey the law. But in ideal conception, citizen-
ship also implies some active contribution to community well-being. In the
Greek city-state, as Aristotle's remark shows, citizens were expected to be
at least part-time public servants. Participation in the community's politi-
cal life was not only a right but an obligation.
As our sense of what it means to be a participant in the society has
enlarged, our definition of the citizen's responsibility has expanded to in-
clude the notion that each of us is responsible for taking care of himself and
his family. In one perspective, this view of responsibility implies a claim to
respect, which the individual can legitimately make against the society. One
aspect of the relationship between a citizen's responsibilities and the value
of respect is manifested in our philosophy of the criminal process, the pro-
cess of adjudging someone responsible. As Sanford Kadish has remarked,
the constitutional limitations on the criminal process are influenced impor-
tantly by our conceptions of the dignity or respect that is owed to each
individual. And Herbert Morris has eloquently shown how punishment is
part of the right to be treated as a person, rather than an object to be
manipulated through 'therapy.' The close linkage of responsibility and re-
spect also implies that full citizenship is incompatible with the dependency
of caste. To be a fully respected member of the society, one must be treated
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
based Jeffersonian viewpoint and the more recent legacy of Hamiltonian
Imperialism, to suggest that the principle of equal citizenship provides a
break from past policies of territorialism, while at the same time offering
a commitment to the future well-being of neglected peoples living in the
United States' insular possessions. Furthermore, we contend that the logi-
cal, natural, and inevitable denouement of equal citizenship within the
American constitutional framework must necessarily culminate in the
eventual admission of these citizens into organized and sovereign states of
our democratic Federation, unless they choose otherwise. Consequently,
statehood for our insular citizens becomes not only a right inherent in
their national citizenship, but also a pragmatic solution to the problems
of colonialism and inequality which our Constitution does not tolerate.
Moreover, we further contend that the right to equality and national citi-
zenship constitute reasonable demands which have been traditionally
raised throughout the history of American statehood by the peoples sub-
jected to a burdensome and demeaning colonial experience. As we have
as capable of taking responsibility. Conversely, the symbolism of depen-
dency is a primary target of the principle of equal citizenship.
From another angle, however, a citizen's responsibility to contribute to
society by caring for herself is seen to be the basis not for a claim against
society, but for an obligation to her fellow citizens. The ethic of self-reli-
ance is deeply ingrained in American values. Thus, the idea of responsibil-
ity does not uniformly support claims of the right to have society act to
equalize conditions. As we shall see in examining the problem of economic
inequalities, there are many cases in which the responsibilities of citizen-
ship weigh on the other side of the constitutional balance.
The idea of equal citizenship is not incompatible with all forms of ine-
quality. Indeed, hierarchy itself can be a source of self-respect. In any case,
most hierarchies in our socieity are difficult for the law to reach. Further-
more, the very existence of law necessarily implies inequalities of some
kinds, since the enforecment of norms requires a body of enforcers, who
stand in a relation of dominance over others, at least within the confines of
the enforcement system. What the principle of equal citizenship offers is
not the end of hierarchy, but increased individual mobility within and be-
tween hierarchies and a heightened sense that some inequalities are toler-
able precisely because they do not 'belie the principle that people are of
equal ultimate worth.' The principles' main targets are distinctions of caste,
not class.
More specifically, the principle of equal citizenship is not a charter for
sweeping economic leveling. While it is surely true that poverty and its re-
suits, in some extreme forms, deny the self-respect that is the core of equal
citizenship, many equalities are consistent with the notion that each of us is
entitled to respect as a person, a participating member of the society. Si-
mone de Beavoir expressed this aspect of equal citizenship-alas, more an
ideal than a fact-with her characteristic grace: '[Tihe rich American has no
grandeur the poor man no servility; human relations in daily life are on a
footing of equality. .. .'
Id. at 6-11 (footnotes omitted).
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seen, equality has served as the foundation for a right to statehood con-
sistently ever since the admission of Vermont, 200 years ago, and has
emerged as the pervading issue behind the statehood movement of almost
every other community that has entered the Union. In a like manner, the
right to national citizenship and the privileges and immunities, which ad-
here to it were vehemently in support of demands for admission on the
part of the citizens of Louisiana, Florida, California, Nevada, the
Dakotas, Alaska and Hawaii. In all cases, citizenship was exalted as the
direct source of the right to admission or as the basis of a congressional
pledge for statehood. The admission of 37 states clearly suggests that
Congress has respected this right (at least implicitly) once the constitu-
tional and traditional guidelines for admission have been satisfied.
The admission of each state into the Union heralded, of course, the
end of colonial rule and the fulfillment of equal citizenship for the mem-
bers of each new political community. This new reality has been indicated
by several factors: the development of local government capabilities based
upon the principles of self-determination and popular sovereignty; and
full participation of the citizens of the new state in the decisionmaking
process of the Nation. With statehood came new political rights which
included voting representation in both Houses of Congress, the right to
vote for the President and Vice President of the United States, the right
to a voice and vote in the amendment process of the Federal Constitu-
tion, full congressional voting representation in the war and treaty mak-
ing processes, and the right to vote in the selection of Federal judges and
officials. The new reality has also indicated the end of all discrimination
against residents of the state in the application of Federal laws and pro-
grams, the transfer of vital public lands and natural resources to the peo-
ple of the new State to help them in their economic and social develop-
ment towards becoming a self-sufficient sovereign entity and, finally the
shedding of a collective stigma of inferiority and the birth of a new era of
self-confidence and collective pride. Paraphrasing the words of a keen ob-
server, the path to equal citizenship has been slowly blazed by the con-
tinuous flow of the self-assured rather than by the anguished tremor of
the colonized!
VI. CONCLUSION
Today it remains to be seen whether statehood, as a right inherent in
the concept of equal citizenship, will be recognized by Congress, the
courts, the legal community, the Federal bureaucracy, and, more impor-
tantly, by the American public in general. Future areas of debate will be
concerned with whether the congressional power to admit new members
into the Union is limited or constrained by this constitutional right, once
the citizens of a given colony decide to demand statehood. In all
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probability, due to the eminently political nature of this issue, the ques-
tion of statehood will never be fully adjudicated by a court of law even
though the fundamental civil rights of the citizens of such an area might
be involved. Furthermore, it is plausible that once the irreversible tide of
decolonization begins to sweep the American territorial system, the forces
of history, the demands of the colonial masses, national public opinion,
international pressures, moral arguments, and political considerations will
expedite a solution to America's colonial problem and the end to the exis-
tence of second class citizenship before the end of this century.
However, once the principle of equal citizenship and the plight of our
colonial peoples have been fully understood, there becomes no way to
deny admission to the citizens of Puerto Rico when and if they exercise
their right to self-determination by choosing to demand that status. After
all, the concept of statehood, like American democracy, is not static. As
the Nation undergoes change, inching towards a more pluralistic, just and
egalitarian society, the right of membership in the national community
must necessarily expand to include all American citizens living in the
overseas possessions. In this context, statehood, as a legitimate source of
equal rights, could be the wave of the future and a "quantum leap" in a
peoples' long road to freedom!
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